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1Apology
	 It	is	perhaps	tacitly	understood	that	one’s	methods	and	approach	to	a	subject	necessarily	depend	to	
a	large	degree	on	the	subject	itself,	that	is	to	say,	that	what	one	wants	to	say	gives	shape	to	the	way	in	which	
it	must	be	said.	This	understanding	is	often	tacit	because	it	is	not	often	essential	to	bring	direct	attention	to	
this	fact,	as	the	theoretical	underpinning	of 	scholarly	investigation	in	most	every	field	has	predecessors	to	
which	they	can	point	as	justification	of 	its	particular	methods:	for	example,	a	philosopher	of 	language	need	
only	point	to	the	work	of 	a	Russell	or	Wittgenstein,	and	need	not	necessarily	develop	his	own	methods,	or	
justification	of 	them,	in	order	to	work	out	the	creation	of 	a	logical	foundation	for	language,	because	that	
foundation	has	a	long-standing	and	well-grounded	tradition,	which	can	stand	in	for	any	explicit	statement	
of 	method.	Similarly–though	of 	course	this	is	perhaps	a	gross	oversimplification–a	historical	approach	to	
the	understanding	of 	art,	in	both	its	practice	and	personalities,	has	a	tradition	that	allows	for	certain	meth-
ods	to	be	adopted	in	lieu	of 	the	need	to	justify	them.	We	are	able,	in	short,	to	discuss	the	historical	implica-
tions	of 	a	particular	work	or	body	of 	work	as	it	has	impacted,	or	ought	to	impact,	the	historical	develop-
ment	and	experience	of 	art.	Unfortunate	or	not,	I	find	it	here	personally	necessary	to	begin	with	such	an	
attempt	at	justification,	as	my	subject	is	not	one	that	can	be	so	easily	subsumed	by	any	tradition	of 	which	I	
am	currently	aware.	
	 The	case	is	that	my	subject,	Kurt	Schwitters’s	Merzbau,	requires	an	approach	that	can	take	into	
account	a	number	of 	salient	facts	that	do	not,	in	a	broad	sense,	apply	to	many	other	art	objects:	primar-
ily,	we	must	keep	in	mind	that	the	work	no	longer	physically	exists;	that	the	documentation	of 	the	work	is	
fragmentary	at	best,	with	long	gaps	in	the	historical	record	of 	its	over	thirteen	year	history;	that	it	was	never	
explicitly	finished	in	the	artist’s	understanding	of 	it–though	perhaps	several	times	thought	to	be	in	a	state	
2of 	completion;	and,	finally,	that	it	existed	in	a	highly	volatile	and	ever-expanding	state	of 	construction.	Not	
only	must	we	find	a	way	of 	discussing	the	work	in	relation	to	these	highly	limiting	circumstances,	but	we	
must	also,	I	believe,	find	a	method	which	can,	more	importantly,	find	some	way	of 	constructing	a	theoreti-
cal	framework	to	justify	the	experience	of 	such	a	work	as	art–specifically,	one	that	no	longer	exists,	nor	one	
that	can	be	grasped	in	any	complete	sense.	For	the	aesthetic	experience	of 	the	Merzbau	is	essentially	a	medi-
ated	one,	that	mediation	being	the	historical	record	of 	its	construction.	My	purpose	in	writing,	therefore,	is	
to	attempt	an	aesthetic	rescue	of 	the	Merzbau	before	even	such	a	mediated	experience	disappears	into	the	
void	of 	lost	time.	This	aesthetic	rescue	is	dependent	on	the	development	of 	two	distinct	but,	I	believe,	intri-
cately	bound	up	approaches	to	art,	the	first	being	a	reconstruction	of 	that	historical	record	as	per	the	usual	
rules	of 	art	historical	criticism;	and	the	second	being	a	theoretical	exegesis	of 	art’s	historical	function,	such	
as	it	finds	expression	in	the	works	of 	Walter	Benjamin	and	Peter	Bürger,	Theodor	Adorno,	and	Herbert	
Marcuse;	and	finally,	the	application	of 	such	a	theoretical	approach	to	the	Merzbau	itself.	
	 I	draw	attention	to	this	because	my	aim	is	not	only	to	rescue	the	Merzbau	historically,	but	aestheti-
cally	as	well.	The	difference	rests	principally	in	that	the	first	seeks	merely	to	place	the	work	in	an	historical	
context,	to	give	it	an	historical	value,	while	the	second	seeks	to	return	to	the	work	an	aesthetic	value.	What,	
you	may	ask,	is	an	“aesthetic	value”?	At	least	in	distinction	to	an	historical	value,	which	seeks	primarily	to	
develop	the	importance	of 	an	event	or	series	of 	events,	as	past,	that	can	be	seen	to	shape	our	present	in	
some	way,	an	aesthetic	value,	as	I	understand	it,	is	one	in	which	our	present	experience	can	become	impor-
tant	for	the	past.	This	value	can	only	be	rescued,	therefore,	by	finding	some	way	in	which	the	work	can	still	
be	experienced	aesthetically	in	the	present.	This	is	problematic	for	many	works	of 	art,	but	for	different	rea-
sons:	for	example,	Marcel	Duchamp’s	Fountain,	if 	anything,	was	never	intended	to	be	appreciated	at	art	at	
all–if 	we	are	to	prefer	his	statements	on	the	matter	over	our	own	experience	of 	the	work	(Cabanne	47)–and	
yet	we	now	see	a	contemporary	art	and	art	criticism	extolling	the	virtues	of 	the	ready-made;	we	could	also	
look	at	the	absurd	predicament	in	which	the	Mona Lisa	finds	itself,	encased	in	glass	and	crowded	by	tourists,	
denying	most	every	possibility	of 	approaching	the	work	as	anything	but	a	cultural	spectacle.	To	return	to	
the	point	at	hand,	however,	if 	we	can	yet	experience	the	Merzbau	aesthetically,	we	must	find	a	way	in	which	
memory	can	become	an	aesthetic	experience,	or	at	least	a	proxy	for	such	an	experience.	This	conviction,	
3as	will	be	seen,	comes	out	of 	a	proper	understanding	of 	Schwitters’s	artistic	practice	of 	Merz,	and	finds	its	
most	evocative	expression	in	the	grottoes	of 	the	Merzbau.	I	am	strongly	against	the	idea	of 	looking	at	the	
documentation	of 	the	work	as	the	aesthetic	experience,	whether	it	be	in	photographs	or	writing,	as	that	
seems	a	simple	and	unsatisfying	way	out	of 	the	real	dilemma,	which	is	how	the	entirety	of 	the	Merzbau	can	
be	experienced	aesthetically–that	is,	the	work	that	Schwitters	experienced.	The	documentation	has	an	his-
torical	importance,	as	it	is	the	lens	through	which	we	see	the	work;	nevertheless,	it	is	not	the	work	itself,	and	
we	must	therefore	inure	ourselves	from	the	dangerous	position	of 	seeing	it	aesthetically.	What	this	means	is	
that	we	must	find	a	way	in	which	memory	can	serve	as	the	primary–even	only–experience	of 	a	work	of 	art	
while	preserving	the	work’s	value	as	art	and	not,	as	is	only	too	likely,	limiting	it	to	a	purely	historical	value.	
It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	such	an	approach	can	overcome	the	imposing	limitations	placed	upon	such	
an	aim,	or	whether	I	will	only	further	the	physical	destruction	of 	the	Merzbau	by	destroying	it	spiritually	as	
well.	
4
5Building
	 The	most	straightforward	way	to	reconstruct	the	Merzbau	is	to	approach	it	chronologically.	There	
are	two	reasons	for	this:	first,	that	attempting	to	reconstruct	the	work	atemporally,	or	in	reverse,	has	the	
distinct	disadvantage	of 	creating	unnecessary	confusion,	and,	secondly,	that	the	work	is	to	a	large	extent	
the	result	of 	a	steady	accumulation	of 	layers,	suggesting,	therefore,	that	one	is	likely	best	served	by	working	
from	its	beginnings	and	innermost	layers	outwards	as	much	as	possible.	This	provides	us	the	natural	benefit	
of 	seeing	the	progression	of 	the	work’s	outward	expansion	as	a	movement	outward	from	a	core	motivation,	
that	is,	that	the	early	works	compose	the	foundations	and	innermost	layers	of 	its	construction.	There	are	
difficulties	with	this	approach	insofar	as	the	historical	record	is	often	incomplete	or	contradictory	as	to	the	
relative	chronology	of 	the	additions	to	the	work;	and,	what	is	more,	the	only	person	aside	from	Schwitters	
who	could	have	hypothetically	seen	the	whole	work	was	Helma,	his	wife,	suggesting	that	even	when	reli-
able	testimony	about	the	work	is	extant,	the	probability	of 	such	testimony	being	able	to	pinpoint	the	order	
and	magnitude	of 	the	Merzbau’s	accumulation	of 	material,	or	its	specific	constituents,	is	nil.	We	should	not	
let	this	deter	us,	however,	as	the	exact	order	and	placement	of 	materials	is,	in	a	certain	sense,	somewhat	in-
consequential,	as	it	behooves	us	more	to	find	the	work’s	general	trajectory	than	to	engage	in	the	wild	goose	
chase	of 	pinpointing	the	exact	details	of 	the	work:	where	the	first	can	within	reason	be	reliably	plotted,	the	
second	is	pure	fantasy.	We	should,	however,	keep	the	preceding	fact	in	mind	in	order	to	avoid	the	tempta-
tion	of 	providing	guesses	as	to	precise	factors	in	the	work’s	construction,	as	it	would	be	both	unwise	and	
misleading	to	point	to	specific	developments	in	the	work	without	substantial	evidence.	
	 In	general,	the	development	of 	the	work	can	be	plotted	within	four	distinct	periods.	The	first	is	the	
years	1919	to	1924	when	Schwitters	formulated	and,	to	some	extent,	formalized	his	one-man	art	move-
6ment,	Merz,	and	created	a	few	important	predecessors	to	the	Merzbau.	The	second	is	the	years	from	1924-
1933,	when	the	work	was	still	in	its	infancy	and	went	by	an	earlier	name,	The Cathedral of  Erotic Misery,	
or	KdeE	as	it	is	often	abbreviated.	The	third	period	begins	with	Hitler’s	rise	to	power,	during	which	the	
majority	of 	the	work	was	constructed;	and	the	final	period	starts	in	1937,	and,	as	I	would	like	to	suggest,	
continues	into	the	present,	wherein	the	total	destruction	of 	the	Merzbau	has	been	accomplished.	I	would	
like	to	take	each	of 	these	in	turn,	with	the	intention	of 	developing	both	a	reconstruction	of 	the	work	itself,	
but	also,	where	appropriate,	a	reconstruction	of 	the	social	and	political	climate	in	Germany.	As	I	hope	will	
become	apparent,	the	choice	of 	separating	the	life	of 	this	work	into	these	four	periods	coincides	not	only	
with	artistic	developments	in	Schwitters’s	life,	but	also	historical	developments	in	interwar	Germany.	No	
less,	these	historical	developments	in	many	ways	anticipate,	or,	more	strongly,	condition	Schwitters’s	interest	
and	changing	appreciation	of 	the	Merzbau,	as	well	as	influencing	his	understanding	of 	Merz.	
	 Before	I	begin	this	reconstruction,	however,	I	would	like	to	give	as	brief 	an	introduction	as	will	serve	
to	indicate	the	general	themes	of 	Schwitters’s	work.	More	specifics	will	be	offered	later	as	I	turn	my	atten-
tion	to	an	exploration	of 	these	themes	within	the	Merzbau,	but	they	will	make	a	significant	deal	more	sense	
with	a	proper	introduction	to	some	overarching	trends.	
	 The	interpretations	of 	Schwitters’s	work	tend	to	fall	within	two	camps,	one	side	seeing	Schwitters’	
oeuvre	as	social	and	political	commentary,	while	the	other	emphasizes	its	spiritual	and	alchemical	qualities.	
The	first	position	is	formulated	well	by	Dorothea	Deitrich	in	her	The Collages of  Kurt Schwitters,	the	second	by	
Elizabeth	Burns	Gamard	in	Kurt Schwitters’ Merzbau: The Cathedral of  Erotic Misery.	For	now	it	should	suffice	
to	point	to	some	of 	the	underlying	differences	and	similarities	between	these	two	camps.	Significantly,	both	
Deitrich	and	Gamard	characterize	Schwitters’	artistic	practice	as	a	“salvaging	operation”	(Deitrich	181),	
one	which	moreover	entails	a	transformation	of 	trash	into	art,	the	poor	into	the	rich,	or,	to	borrow	the	
alchemical	metaphor,	from	lead	into	gold.	This	salvaging	operation	is	likewise	characterized	as	“a	path	of 	
rescue,	a	means	to	salvation”	(Gamard	28)	or	a	way	“to	reclaim	personal	wholeness	and	control	in	the	face	
of 	fragmentation	and	chaos”	(Deitrich	181).	Merz	art	is,	then,	for	both	these	writers,	an	attempt	to	rescue	
the	individual	from	the	precarious	and	fragmentary	material	conditions	of 	life	into	a	sense	of 	wholeness.	
As	Deitrich	characterizes	it,	“For	[Schwitters],	the	junk	heap	of 	the	past	harbored	the	possibility	of 	a	new	
7future	that	acknowledged	fragmentation	as	a	given,	but	conceived	of 	creativity	as	an	act	of 	redemption”	
(12).	
	 His	art	is	thus	principally	a	product	of 	his	lifelong	obsession	with	retrieving	and	giving	form	to	the	
waste	of 	industrial	society:	there	are,	of 	course,	numerous	accounts	of 	Schwitters	collecting,	sorting,	stor-
ing,	and	Merzing	the	enormous	amount	of 	materials	he	would	gather,	both	day	to	day	around	Hanover	
and	on	his	many	trips	around	Europe.	To	provide	a	sense	of 	scale,	Hannah	Höch	described	a	trip	she	took	
with	him	in	1926	this	way:	“As	always	with	Kurt	Schwitters,	departure	was	like	moving	house.	He	had	four	
or	five	enormous	and	as	usual	idiotically	overweight	suitcases	.	.	.	Three	times	we	had	to	climb	the	107	steps	
to	my	studio	in	order	to	take	everything	down”	(Webster	184).	These	suitcases	were	in	all	likelihood	filled	
with	broken	tires,	newspaper	scraps,	wood	scraps,	metal	scraps,	toys,	packaging–any	sort	of 	material	he	
could	use	in	his	Merz	pictures.	Kate	Steinitz	quotes	him	as	saying,	“Helma	my	dear,	preserve	everything”	
(Steinitz	47),	which,	taken	with	the	account	from	Höch,	must	serve	to	stand	as	my	small	way	of 	suggesting	
that	for	Kurt,	the	collection	of 	the	past	was	its	preservation	and	form-giving.	
	 It	is	with	their	agreement	about	Schitters’s	salvaging	operation,	however,	that	the	differences	begin	
to	arise	in	Gamard	and	Deitrich’s	interpretations,	primarily	dealing	with	the	status	of 	history	and	tradition	
within	the	Merzbau.	Gamard	sees	the	work	as	“transhistorical	in	nature	and	therefore	at	once	profoundly	
sentimental	and	messianic”	(Gamard	24);	as	such,	she	consequently	diminishes	the	relevance	of 	contempo-
rary	social	and	political	developments	in	Germany	in	the	20’s	and	30’s	and	instead	focuses	on	the	spiritual	
dimensions	of 	the	work.	Conversely,	Deitrich	sees	Schwitters’s	work	precisely	in	terms	of 	those	develop-
ments	and	therefore	emphasizes	not	redemption	in	a	spiritual	sense	but	in	a	political	one.	I	would	not	like	
to	take	sides,	as	each	interpretation	has	a	certain	validity	within	its	proper	principles.	Nevertheless,	in	what	
immediately	follows	I	am	more	interested	in	developing	the	relation	of 	Schwitters’s	Merzbau	to	the	socio-
political	environment,	even	though	this	is	perhaps	only	in	order	to	speak	to	the	spiritual	dimensions	after-
wards.	What	is	more	important,	then,	is	to	work	towards	overcoming	these	differences	in	the	creation	of 	a	
synthesis	between	the	political	and	spiritual	dimensions	of 	the	work,	as	it	is	in	many	ways	both	material	and	
spirit,	and	requires	that	we	incorporate	both	aspects	into	our	interpretation.	
	 The	final	consideration	before	we	move	into	the	history	of 	the	work	itself 	is	the	extent	to	which	
8Hanover,	Schwitters’s	birthplace,	and	home	at	Waldhausenstrasse	5	influenced	and	supported	his	artistic	
development	and	concerns.	“My	fatherland,	Waldhausenstrasse”	(Webster	231),	is	how	he	described	it	in	
an	earlier	draft	of 	an	essay	published	in	1930,	and	as	such	evidences	the	extreme	attachment	and	love	he	
felt	towards	Hanover	and	his	family	house,	to	the	extent	of 	localizing	his	patriotism	not	to	Germany,	or	
Weimar,	or	the	world,	but	within	the	confines	of 	his	own	home.	As	it	applies	to	the	Merzbau,	it	is	within	
this	house	that	the	work	was	created	and	from	which	it	drew	strength	and	life,	and	it	is	thus	an	inseparable	
element	of 	the	work.	We	will	have	recourse	to	the	importance	of 	his	life	in	Hanover	and	the	complexities	
to	the	work	which	develop	through	its	insertion	into	the	bourgeois	domestic	space,	but	for	now	it	is	best	to	
simply	introduce	the	importance	of 	this	fact	as	we	progress	into	the	reconstruction	of 	the	work	itself.
Merz: 1919-1924
	 The	year	1919	represents	a	dramatic	turning	point	in	Schwitters’s	art,	as	it	is	the	point	at	which	his	
career	as	an	artist	is	launched:	he	secured	his	first	major	exhibition	in	Herwarth	Walden’s	Sturm	gallery	in	
Berlin,	the	principal	gallery	space	for	new	German	art.	It	is	in	response	to	the	critics’	reaction	to	this	exhibi-
tion	that	he	invents	Merz,	first	as	a	way	of 	advertising	and	differentiating	his	art,	but	it	rapidly	becomes	the	
guiding	principle	behind	his	art.	The	story	goes	roughly	this	way:	in	1918,	Schwitters	was	making	a	series	
of 	abstract	water	colors,	to	one	of 	which	he	attached	a	fragment	of 	the	word	Kommerzbank–the	four	letters	
“merz.”	After	said	negative	reception	by	the	Berlin	art	critics,	he	published	his	defense,	“Merz	painting,”	in	
the	Sturm	journal,	effectively	proclaiming	himself 	a	Merz	artist.	In	the	following	year	he	published	a	follow-
up	essay	simply	entitled	“Merz,”	and	it	is	to	these	two	articles	that	I	would	like	to	position	the	groundwork	
for	an	understanding	of 	what	Merz	art	meant	for	Schwitters	in	its	infancy.
	 He	writes,	“In	effect,	the	word	Merz	signifies	the	assembly	towards	artistic	ends	of 	every	material	
imaginable	and,	in	principal,	the	equality	of 	each	of 	these	materials	on	the	work’s	organization”	(Schwit-
ters	7),	anticipating	the	sudden	expansion	into	abstract	collage	of 	found	objects	his	work	would	soon	
experience.	These	assemblages	are	directed	by	a	few	rather	interesting	principles,	the	first	being	the	equality	
of 	materials:	this	is,	of 	course,	a	direct	confrontation	with	the	prevailing	and	stale	attachment	of 	the	tradi-
tional	art	world	to	oil	painting.	But	it	could	in	fact	be	said	that	Merz	is	revolutionary	twice	over,	as	not	only	
9does	it	reject	or	diminish	the	importance	of 	oil	painting,	it	simultaneously	raises	to	the	realm	of 	art	scraps	
of 	paper,	discarded	industrial	goods,	minerals,	organic	waste,	and	the	nails	and	glue	used	to	stick	them	
all	together.	This	should	be	firmly	contrasted	with	the	Dadaists’	collage	practices,	at	least	in	intention,	as	
their	practice	was	motivated	towards	the	creation	of 	non-art,	anti-art,	while	Schwitters’s	art	was	motivated	
towards	the	creation	of 	pure	art.	As	Deitrich	characterizes	the	importance	of 	this	equality,	“His	is	an	inher-
ently	democratic	process”	(Deitrich	12)	(again	to	be	contrasted	with	the	Dadaists,	who,	in	the	case	of 	Grosz	
and	Heartfield,	made	explicitly	communistic	art)	because	it	signals	the	destruction	of 	the	hierarchy	of 	high	
and	low	art	and	its	replacement	with	a	principle	of 	artistic	equality.	
	 This	equality	of 	materials	is	further	emphasized	by	an	equality	and	unification	of 	artistic	genres	in	
the	“total	Merz	work	of 	art”	(Schwitters	18),	which	is	primarily	identified	in	terms	of 	theater.	This	is	not	
necessarily	a	new	concept,	considering	the	precedent	of 	Wagner,	but	there	is	nevertheless	a	novelty	in	his	
approach:	
In	short,	use	everything	.	.	.	and	always	in	consideration	of 	the	proportions	demanded	by	
the	work.
	 Even	individuals	can	be	used.
	 Even	individuals	can	be	attached	to	the	decor.
	 Even	individuals	can	enter	the	stage,	even	in	their	usual	position,	on	two	legs,	speak-
ing	even	in	comprehensible	language.	(Schwitters	20)
In	short,	it	is	not	only	objects	and	artistic	practices	but	also	people	that	are	treated	as	equal	materials.	
	 The	essential	corollary	to	the	equality	of 	materials	is	Schwitters’s	belief 	in	fixed	expression,	which	
he	phrases	this	way:	
Each	line,	each	color,	each	form	has	a	fixed	expression.	Each	combination	of 	line,	color,	and	
form	has	a	fixed	expression.	This	expression	depends	on	a	specific	composition,	and	cannot	
be	translated.	Words	cannot	grasp	the	expression	of 	a	painting,	just	as	one	cannot	paint	the	
expression	of 	a	word,	like	the	word	“and”	for	example.		
The	choice	of 	material	then,	or	the	choice	of 	genre,	implies	a	choice	of 	expression	which	cannot	be	trans-
lated	into	any	other	material	or	genre	and	is	specific	to	it.	That	is	to	say,	that	the	choice	of 	assemblage	for	
Schwitters	meant	the	creation	of 	an	artistic	practice	that	seeks	to	bridge	or	overcome	the	separation	and	
mutual	exclusivity	of 	individual	forms	and	practices	from	one	another	by	creating	a	space	in	which	each	
expression	is	chosen	for	its	particular	method	of 	communication,	“an	immediate	expression	through	the	
reduction	of 	the	distance	between	the	intuition	and	visualization	of 	the	work	of 	art”	(Schwitters	7).	Paint,	
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shoe	laces,	newsprint,	glass,	poetry,	sculpture–each	provides	a	specific	way	and	content	of 	expression,	which	
the	assembleur	contrasts	and	combines	with	other	materials	to	create	a	work	that	contains	multiple	ways	and	
contents	of 	expression.	
	 There	is	a	final	consideration	for	getting	our	understanding	of 	Merz	art	on	a	solid	footing,	and	that	
is	the	inherent	fluidity	of 	its	definition.	As	he	writes,	
The	word	“Merz,”	at	the	time	in	which	I	formed	it,	had	no	meaning.	It	has	henceforth	the	
meaning	that	I	give	to	it	as	I	go	along.	The	meaning	of 	the	concept	“Merz”	is	modified	
according	to	the	experiences	and	conscience	of 	those	who	work	continually	in	the	sense	of 	
that	concept.	(Schwitters	15)
Merz	is	thus	by	definition	undefined,	as	its	meaning	depends	entirely	on	the	way	it	is	used	by	the	people	
employing	it.	This	means,	essentially,	that	the	meaning	of 	Merz	depends	on	the	use	Schwitters	puts	it	to,	
and	is	perhaps	only	a	convenient	slogan	or	advertising	device	for	the	individuation	of 	his	personal	aesthetic.	
It	is,	however,	much	more	helpful	to	see	Merz	as	a	perspective	on	art	making	that	allows	for	a	fluid	inter-
pretation	of 	the	meaning	of 	art,	artist,	and	work.	In	this	way,	we	are	able	to	see	the	use	of 	“every	material	
imaginable”	as	an	experimentation	with	the	boundaries	of 	art,	and	the	calling	into	question	the	validity	of 	
those	boundaries.	The	total	Merz	work	of 	art	acts	as	the	guarantor	of 	the	disintegration	and	nullification	
of 	these	boundaries.	
	 The	birth	of 	Merz	in	1919	is	significant	for	a	second	reason,	and	that	is	its	concurrence	with	the	
establishment	of 	the	Weimar	Republic	in	August	of 	that	year:	Merz	as	a	democratic	art	is	founded	in	the	
political	climate	that	sees	the	introduction	of 	democracy	to	Germany.	But	there	is	a	problematic	element	
here,	which	is	that	the	experimental	nature	of 	Schwitters’s	art	found	a	parallel	in	the	stuttering	first	steps	of 	
the	fledgling	Weimar	Republic.	The	ensuing	social	turmoil	caused	both	by	Germany’s	defeat	in	World	War	
I	and	the	punitive	Versailles	Treaty,	the	removal	of 	Wilhelm	II	from	the	throne,	and	news	of 	the	Bolshevik	
Revolution	in	1917	planted	the	seeds	of,	as	Deitrich	characterizes	the	Weimar	Republic,	“a	chronic,	deep-
rooted	conflict”	(Deitrich	15).	In	the	vacuum	left	by	the	disintegration	of 	the	monarchy,	Germany	saw	the	
materialization	of 	a	strong	revolutionary	movement	spearheaded	by	Rosa	Luxemburg	and	Karl	Liebknecht	
that,	with	the	example	of 	the	Bolshevik	success	in	Russia	(or	at	least	what	they	thought	was	a	success)	of 	
creating	a	communist	government,	sought	to	do	the	same	in	Germany.	The	months	following	Germany’s	
defeat	saw	the	proclamation	of 	two	separate	governments,	one	under	the	leadership	of 	the	Social	Demo-
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cratic	Party,	and	the	second	proclaimed	by	Liebknecht,	which	culminated	in	the	general	strike	known	as	
the	Spartacist	Uprising	in	January.	Though	it	is	unlikely	that	Schwitters	himself 	had	any	serious	interest	in	
the	revolution,	the	sudden	formation	of 	a	number	of 	artists’	groups,	such	as	the	Novembergruppe,	indicates	an	
artistic	commitment	to	revolutionary	aims:	“By	evoking	the	goals	of 	the	November	revolts,	they	all	define	
themselves	as	revolutionary	in	intent”	(Deitrich	20).	The	first	months	of 	the	Republic’s	existence	evidenced	
growing	social	violence,	the	escalation	of 	which	led	the	Socialist	leaders	to	employ	the	nationalist	and	right-
wing	organization	of 	Friekorps	soldiers	to	put	down	the	incipient	revolution,	leading	to	the	murders	of 	Lux-
emburg	and	Liebknecht	in	early	1919	and	the	dissolving	of 	the	revolution.	With	this	Germany	achieved	the	
restoration	of 	a	tense	but	operable	social	order,	tainted,	as	it	would	only	later	become	clear	to	what	extent	
and	purpose,	by	a	reliance	on	the	political	right	and	their	street	fighters.	
	 As	the	years	went	on,	poverty	in	Germany	accelerated	to	create	the	all	too	familiar	crisis	of 	mass	
unemployment	and	hyperinflation	in	effect	by	1923.	With	the	mark	valued	at	4.3	trillion	to	the	dollar,	the	
possibility	of 	fine	art	in	Germany	would	at	first	appear	absurd	if 	not	outright	laughable.	But	the	European	
avant-garde–many	of 	whom	were	working	and	living	in	Germany–were	especially	active	at	the	time.	As	a	
story	about	Schwitters	reveals,	the	possibility	of 	art	in	an	impoverished	country	was	dependent	on	the	prin-
ciples	he	adopted	with	Merz:	“’We	had	no	money	to	buy	paints	and	canvas.’	And	so,	explained	Moholy,	
Kurt	persuaded	him	to	use	banknotes	instead	of 	paint”	(Webster	144).	Schwitters	himself 	explained	it	this	
way:
Out	of 	parsimony	I	took	whatever	I	found	to	do	this,	because	we	were	now	an	impoverished	coun-
try.	One	can	even	shout	with	refuse,	and	this	is	what	I	did,	nailing	and	gluing	it	together.	I	called	it	
“Merz.”	(Deitrich	6)
We	should	thus	see	an	intimate	relationship	between	the	social	and	political	developments	in	Weimar	Ger-
many	following	the	end	of 	World	War	I	and	Schwitters’s	artistic	development,	in	which	the	principles	of 	
Merz	not	only	enabled	him	to	continue	making	art,	but	arose	as	a	response	to	the	prevailing	social	condi-
tions	by	introducing	found	objects–discarded,	unwanted,	useless	objects–into	his	art.	
	 There	are	then	three	important	pieces	from	this	period	that	foreshadow	the	beginning	of 	his	work	
on	the	Merzbau.	The	first	of 	which,	his	1920	Haus Merz,	is	an	assemblage	of 	toys,	gears,	strips	of 	metal	and	
wood,	a	button,	all	of 	which	mounted	on	a	wood	plank,	depicting	what	can	only	be	a	church.	A	steeple	on	
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the	right	is	counterpoised	to	an	interior	that	is	dominated	by	intertwining	gears.	The	connection	of 	Merz	
with	religion	is	not	incidental,	but,	as	Deitrich	writes,	“The	house	of 	God	.	.	.	has	been	transformed	into	
a	house	for	Merz.	Thus	Merz	is	declared	a	new	religion”	(Deitrich	170).	The	gears	characterize	either	the	
impossibility	of 	worship	within	the	Haus Merz,	as	Gamard	suggests,	or,	conversely,	the	worshipers	as	being	
mechanical	themselves.	This	second	possibility	would	seem	to	implicate	a	mechanized	humanity	for	Merz	
and	Schwitters;	there	is,	however,	a	more	compelling	interpretation:	for	Schwitters,	the	mechanical	was	
the	human,	and	the	human	was	material.	He	writes	in	1921	that	“I	discovered	my	love	for	the	wheel	and	
recognized	that	machines	are	abstractions	of 	the	human	spirit”	(Dietrich	86).	A	modern	Merzreligion	finds	its	
expression	in	Schwitters’	use	of 	the	signifying	power	of 	the	material,	the	machine,	as	an	abstraction	of 	the	
human	being,	and	indicates	reciprocally	a	divine	existence	of 	material.
	 A	second	work	is	Heilige Bekümmernis	(ca.	1920,	alternately	translated	as	Holy	Affliction	(Deitrich),	
Saint	Uncumber	(Webster),	and,	to	add	to	the	confusion	somewhat,	affectionately	referred	to	by	Hans	
Richter	as	“Kurt	Schwitter’s	Christmas	Tree”),	whose	principal	components	are	a	mannequin	he	likely	
acquired	from	his	parents’	clothing	store,	a	red	light	and	a	Christmas	ornament	that	has	replaced	the	head	
and	arm,	respectively,	and	a	music	box	that	played	“Come	Ye	Children.”	The	sculpture	takes	its	name	
from	a	fifteenth-century	saint	who	prayed	to	be	disfigured	to	avoid	marriage,	and	subsequently	grew	a	
beard.	“The	sculpture	clearly	evokes,”	writes	Deitrich,	“the	then	common	sight	of 	a	war	cripple	engaged	in	
small-scale	street	commerce”	(Deitrich	172),	which,	together	with	the	image	of 	the	disfigured	saint,	brings	
to	mind	the	dual	image	of 	the	canonization	and	prostitution	of 	the	war-veteran.	This	bifurcation	makes	for	
the	uneasy	assessment	that	the	work	is	an	allegory	for	the	objectification	of 	the	war-veteran	as	an	eroticized	
object,	but	one	which	is	“no	longer	capable	of 	quenching	desire”	(Deitrich	174)	or	achieving	its	own	satis-
faction.	The	multiple	references	to	Christmas	suggest	a	yearning	for	tradition	within	the	fragmented	and	
disfigured	present,	while	simultaneously	calling	into	question	that	tradition	as	farcical	and,	conversely,	pos-
ing	the	present	as	intercessory.		
	 The	third,	the	Merzsäule,	or	Merz-column	of 	1923,	is	essentially	the	foundation	of 	the	Merzbau,	and	
acted	as	the	base	of 	the	KdeE. Composed	of 	“the	debris	of 	materialist	society	seemingly	heaped	at	random	
upon	each	other”	(Deitrich	176),	the	combination	of 	children’s	toys,	newsprint,	photographs,	wood	and	
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metal	scraps,	dried	flowers,	an	animal’s	horn,	plaster	casts,	and	a	doll’s	head	affixed	to	the	top,	creates	an	
overwhelming	sense	of 	order	through	chaos.	A	collage	affixed	to	the	base	suggests,	for	Gamard,	“symbolic	
references	that	point	to	mystical	aspects	of 	Christianity”	(Gamard	91)	in	the	figures	of 	the	Madonna	and	
Child	and	their	attendants,	and	indicates	therefore	a	foundation	in	spirituality.	The	work	is	an	example	of 	
the	reorganization	of 	the	material	society	in	which	the	spiritual	principles	of 	art-making	predominate.	Es-
sential	to	understanding	the	Merzsäule	is	the	head	that	crowns	the	work,	because	it	is	in	reality	not	a	man-
nequin	but	the	death	mask	of 	Schwitters’	second	son.	The	inclusion	of 	his	son’s	death	mask	(in	an	earlier	
version,	it	was	a	bust	of 	his	wife	thought	to	be	titled	Suffering)	encourages	two	complementary	perspectives:	
first,	that	the	work	functions	autobiographically,	as	though	being	an	objectivation	of 	Schwitters’	sense	of 	
loss	and	attempts	to	come	to	terms	with	his	own	grief;	and	secondly,	as	a	reflection	on	the	fragility	of 	life	
and	the	hope	for	spiritual	redemption.	The	work	moreover	can	be	seen	as	a	materialization	of 	Schwitters’	
attempts	to	remember	and	give	form	to	the	past.
	 As	for	how	these	works	prefigure	the	Merzbau,	the	Haus Merz	functions	as	“my	first	Merz	architec-
ture”	(Schwitters	18)	and	should	thus	be	seen	as	his	first	attempt	at	creating	an	architecture	through	assem-
bly,	while	the	second	and	third	works	were	incorporated	into	the	overall	construction	of 	the	Merzbau	at	one	
point	or	another,	and	function	therefore	as	complex	fragments	within	a	larger	whole	of 	further	fragments.	
The	invocation	of 	saints,	the	Madonna,	the	church	in	these	three	works,	leads	to	the	easy	characteriza-
tion	of 	Schwitters’s	artistic	goal	as	a	transcendent	one,	wherein	the	common	and	disposable	materials	of 	
industrial	capitalism	are	recovered	by	the	artist,	given	form,	and	thereby	spiritualized.	This	transformation	
of 	the	fragmented	dross	of 	material	society	within	the	work	of 	art,	in	these	first	and,	essentially,	originary	
sculptures	leading	to	the	Merzbau,	repeats	itself 	in	the	larger	whole	by	both	synecdoche–the	second	and	
third	are	subsumed	and	can	thus	stand	as	miniatures–and	by	continued	practice,	as	the	use	of 	found	objects	
remained	an	important	dimension	of 	his	later	work.	The	temporal	dualism,	of 	the	breaking	through	of 	
the	past	through	the	individual	histories	of 	each	object	and	their	subjugation	to	a	present	and	formalized	
whole,	retains	its	importance	and,	as	we	will	see,	takes	on	even	greater	importance	as	the	work’s	founda-
tions	are	covered	over	and	buried	within	its	core.	Moreover,	as	core	both	Heilige Bekümmernis	and	the	Mer
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zsäule	must	be	seen	as	shaping	the	significance	of 	the	larger	work	in	their	temporal	precedence	as	well	as	
spatial	interiority.	
KdeE: 1924-1933
	 	Sometime	around	1924,	Schwitters	placed	the	Merzsäule	within	his	studio	and	began	a	kind	of 	
personal	exploration	of 	sculpture	and	architecture.	What	he	eventually	called	the	Kathedrale des erotischen 
Elends,	or	Cathedral	of 	Erotic	Misery,	began	as	a	very	private,	personal	attempt	to	work	through	his	relation	
to	eroticism,	to	his	friends,	and	to	the	world,	and	remained	a	secretive	and	poorly	known	piece	until	1931–
the	year	of 	the	printing	of 	Merz	21,	wherein	Schwitters	included	a	substantial	description	of 	the	work.	
His	Merz	practice	remained	much	the	same	as	ever,	but	his	growing	fame	as	a	cabaret	artist,	the	need	to	
organize,	fund,	and	print	his	Merz	magazine,	and	the	opening	of 	his	advertising	agency,	Merz	Werbezen-
trale,	led	to	Schwitters	having	to	divide	his	time	between	a	number	of 	money-making	endeavors,	as,	even	
though	the	German	economy	began	to	stabilize	after	1924,	it	was	still	a	difficult	place	to	make	a	living–as	
an	abstract	artist	especially	so.	The	1920’s,	then,	were	a	period	of 	both	extreme	energy	and	productivity	
in	a	wide	variety	of 	fields	for	Schwitters,	including	the	1923	Holland	Dada	tour	with	Theo	Van	Doesburg	
and	subsequent	reading	tours	around	Europe,	trips	to	see	friends,	the	modernization	of 	the	Hanover	City	
Council’s	printing	matter	awarded	to	the	Merz	Werbezentrale	in	1929,	and	the	continued	production	and	
exhibition	of 	abstract	Merz	pictures,	landscapes	and	portraits,	poetry,	stories,	and	plays.	It	should	indeed	be	
surprising	to	think	that	with	everything	he	busied	himself 	with	at	the	time	he	should	have	any	left	over	to	
devote	to	his	Kathedrale.	Nevertheless,	it	seems	he	made	every	effort	to	work	on	it,	day	or	night,	to	the	point	
of 	devising	a	way	of 	hammering	in	nails	in	the	middle	of 	the	night.	
	 Of 	the	sparse	accounts	of 	the	work–mostly	from	a	few	close	friends	he	would	permit	to	see	the	
work,	considering	its	essentially	private	nature	and	the	fact	that	it	was	far	from	being	finished–there	are	a	
few	that	are	worth	considering	as	they	offer	at	least	a	basic	chronology	of 	the	piece.	When	Hans	Richter	
saw	it	in	1925,	he	remarked	that	it	“was	a	living,	daily-changing	document	on	Schwitters	and	his	friends”	
(Richter	152).	He	is	making	reference,	most	likely,	to	the	fact	that	around	1924	the	Merzsäule	began	to	ac-
cumulate	what	Schwitters	referred	to	as	grottoes,	or	small	pockets	or	holes	in	the	overall	sculpture,	that	
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contained	possessions	of 	his	friends,	possessions	in	many	cases	stolen	from	their	owners.	These	friendship	
grottoes	accounted	for	many	of 	his	artistic	and	personal	relations,	including,	of 	course,	ones	for	his	wife	
and	son,	and	by	the	end	of 	the	decade	had	convinced	Schwitters	to	simply	ask	for	donations	to	the	work:
.	.	.	it	had	become	a	truly	democratic	work	in	which	contributions	from	others	were	not	only	wel-
comed	but	encouraged.	[El]	Lissitsky	provided	a	small	cage	structure,	[Herwarth]	Walden,	[Hans]	
Arp,	[Laszlo]	Moholy,	[Raoul]	Hausmann,	[Naum]	Gabo	and	[Theo	Van]	Doesburg	added	their	
own	grottoes	and	Hannah	Höch	was	given	the	rare	privilege	of 	being	allowed	to	design	two.	(Web-
ster	222)
This	list	should	give	some	inkling	of 	the	personal	connection	Schwitters	had	with	the	European	avant-
garde	at	the	time,	all	of 	which	were	not	only	professional	relations	but	close	friends	as	well.	When	Richter	
saw	the	structure	again	three	years	later,	he	recounted:
All	the	little	holes	and	concavities	that	we	had	formerly	‘occupied’	were	no	longer	to	be	seen.	“They	
are	all	deep	down	inside,”	Schwitters	explained.	They	were	concealed	by	the	monstrous	growth	of 	
the	column,	covered	by	other	sculptural	excrescences,	new	people,	new	shapes,	colours	and	details.	A	
proliferation	that	never	ceased.	(Richter	152-53)
We	should	see	this	expansion	outward,	with	its	concurrent	burying	of 	previous	layers,	not	as	those	layers	
sinking	into	an	oblivion,	but	as	essential	parts	of 	the	work,	if 	not	in	fact	as	its	internal	organs.	Thus,	when	
his	friends’	grottoes	have	become	fully	subsumed	by	the	later	additions,	just	as	the	Merzsäule	itself 	would	
become,	they	offer	themselves	as	remembered	foundations,	invisible,	yes,	but	life-giving.
	 Rudolf 	Jahns,	following	a	visit	in	1927,	offered	another	account	of 	the	work	that	emphasizes	a	
spiritual	calm	and	stillness	within	Schwitters’s	studio,	the	heart	of 	the	KdeE,	as	well	as	mentioning	the	pres-
ence	of 	a	jar	of 	Schwitters’s	urine	that	held	immortelles.	Finally,	following	his	conviction	that	the	piece	was	
finished–evidenced	by	the	fact	that	he	was	in	contact	with	Katherine	Dreier	of 	the	Société	Anonyme	about	
exhibiting	it,	and	had	made	several	photographs	of 	the	piece	in	1930–Schwitters	published	his	only	public	
statement	about	the	KdeE	in	the	1931	issue	of 	Merz.	I	quote	a	substantial	portion	of 	the	piece	here	because	
it	is,	of 	course,	significant	as	coming	from	the	artist	himself,	but	more	importantly	because	it	powerfully	
evokes	the	“literary	content”	of 	the	work’s	grottoes:	
As	the	structure	grows	bigger	and	bigger,	valleys,	hollows,	caves	appear,	and	these	lead	a	life	of 	their	
own	within	the	overall	structure	.	.	.		Each	grotto	takes	its	character	from	some	principal	compo-
nents.	There	is	the	Nibelungen	Hoard	with	the	glittering	treasure;	the	Kyffhäuser	with	the	stone	
table;	the	Goethe	Grotto	with	one	of 	Goethe’s	legs	as	a	relic	and	a	lot	of 	pencils	worn	down	to	
stubs;	the	submerged	personal-union	city	of 	Braunshweig-Lüneburg	with	houses	from	Weimar	of 	
Karlsruhe,	the	Sex-Crime	Cavern	with	an	abominably	mutilated	corpse	of 	an	unfortunate	young	
girl,	painted	tomato-red,	and	splendid	votive	offerings;	the	Ruhr	district	with	authentic	brown	coal	
16
and	authentic	gas	coke;	an	art	exhibition	with	paintings	and	sculptures	by	Michelangelo	and	my-
self 	being	viewed	by	a	dog	on	a	leash;	the	dog	kennel	with	lavatory	and	a	red	dog;	the	organ,	which	
you	turn	anti-clockwise	to	play	‘Silent	Night,	Holy	Night’	and	‘Come	Ye	Little	Children’;	the	10%	
disabled	war	veteran	with	his	daughter,	who	no	longer	has	a	head	but	keeps	himself 	well,	the	Monna	
Hausmann	consisting	of 	a	reproduction	of 	the	Mona	Lisa	with	the	pasted-on	face	of 	Raoul	Haus-
mann	covering	over	the	3-legged	lady	made	by	Hannah	Höch;	and	the	great	Grotto	of 	Love.
	 The	Love	Grotto	takes	up	approximately	9	1/4	[sic.]	of 	the	base	of 	the	column;	a	wide	
outside	stair	leads	to	it,	underneath	which	stands	the	Female	Lavatory	Attendant	of 	Life	in	a	long	
narrow	corridor	with	scattered	camel	dung.	Two	children	greet	us	and	step	into	life;	owing	to	dam-
age,	only	part	of 	a	mother	and	child	remain.	Shiny	and	broken	objects	set	the	mood.	In	the	middle	
a	couple	is	embracing:	he	has	no	head,	she	no	arms;	between	his	legs	he	is	holding	a	huge	blank	
cartridge.	The	big	twisted-around	child’s	head	with	syphilitic	eyes	is	warning	the	embracing	couple	
to	be	careful.	This	is	disturbing,	but	there	is	reassurance	in	the	little	bottle	of 	my	own	urine	in	which	
immortelles	are	suspended.	I	have	recounted	only	a	tiny	part	of 	the	literary	content	of 	the	column.	
Besides,	many	grottoes	have	vanished	from	sight	under	later	additions,	for	example,	Luther’s	Corner.	
(Kurt Schwitters: Merz–a Total Vision of  the World	58)
	 In	addition	to	the	grottoes	devoted	to	his	friends	and	family,	then,	a	number	of 	other	themes	
emerge	in	this	description	of 	the	“literary	content”	of 	the	KdeE.	A	number	are	devoted	to	German	cultural	
history,	such	as	the	Kyffhäusen	and	Goethe	grottoes;	some	are	commenting	on	contemporary	life,	as	in	
the	10%	disabled	war	veteran;	and	finally	there	is	an	overwhelming	concentration	on	a	disturbed	erotics.	
Disfigured	people,	most	in	intimate	relations	with	one	another,	sex-crime	victims	and	syphilitic	children,	
stare	out	at	the	viewer	as	so	much	collected	debris,	so	much	discarded	fragment	of 	industrial	society.	The	
conglomeration	of 	these	multiple	themes	indicates	a	profound	linkage	between	the	erotic,	the	disfigured,	
the	personal,	and	the	traditional,	instigating	either	the	massive	equating	of 	each	with	the	other	(i.e.	the	
personal	and	traditional	as	disfigured,	the	disfigured	as	erotic,	etc.)	or,	just	as	likely,	the	cohabitation	of 	
separate	realms	of 	human	experience	that,	while	disturbing,	are	nonetheless	subdued	by	the	calming	effect	
of 	the	artist’s	addition	of 	his	own	waste	to	the	work.	This	addition	allows	for	the	conclusion	that	the	subject	
can	overcome	the	fragmentary	world	through	its	organization	and	subjugation	to	artistic	form.
	 And	though	the	center	chamber	of 	the	KdeE	might	suggest,	with	its	still	and	contemplative	inward-
ness,	that	the	work	was	merely	a	moving	inward	for	Schwitters	to	come	to	an	understanding	of 	himself,	the	
work’s	constant	expansion	outward	belies	this	inwardness	with	a	determined	movement	into	unused	space.	
As	objects	became	subsumed	beneath	future	layers	plastered	onto	the	surface,	so	too	the	inner	space	of 	the	
work	became	further	and	further	sublimated	into	the	whole.	The	movement	outward,	both	physically	and	
in	the	incorporation	of 	references	to	historical	and	contemporary	events,	and	of 	course	in	the	grottoes	to	
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his	friends,	suggests	that	the	piece	was	not	only	Schwitters’	attempt	to	understand	or	reclaim	himself,	but	
also	to	understand	and	reclaim	the	world	at	large.	Though	an	essential	aspect	of 	the	work,	the	disappear-
ance	of 	objects	within	it	suggests	that	the	past,	and	man’s	interior	life,	are	always	being	covered	over	by	the	
surface	of 	the	present,	and	what	was	once	lived	experience,	objects	that	were	once	visible,	can	only	per-
petuate	themselves	through	the	internal	process	of 	remembrance.
	 These	grottoes,	moreover,	act	as	fetishes	or	shrines,	as	Dietrich	and	Gamard	position	them	re-
spectively,	such	that	the	objects	stand	in	for	their	owners	as	a	kind	of 	calling	forth	of 	their	spiritual	pres-
ence.	This	presence	takes	the	form,	both	of 	the	person	themselves,	but	more	importantly	as	a	reflection	of 	
Schwitters’s	relationship	with	them.	This	spiritual	presence	is	perhaps	best	understood	in	terms	of 	a	ma-
terialization	of 	Schwitters’s	memory	of 	these	individuals,	much	as	his	son’s	death	mask	functioned	within	
the	Merzsäule.	It	should	be	noted	here	that	Schwitters	is	attempting	to	include	more	than	his	own	artistic	
production	into	the	KdeE,	that	he	is	in	fact	searching	for	the	creation	of 	a	kind	of 	artistic	community	to	be	
expressed	within	the	work	through	the	fragment.	The	fragment	here	takes	a	direct	connection	to	the	indi-
vidual,	insofar	as	the	friendship	grottoes	signify	and	stand	in	for	specific	individuals,	which	evidences	not	
only	a	collection	and	transformation	of 	objects	within	the	KdeE,	but	of 	people	as	well.
	 But	the	world	had	since	become	a	dangerous	place.	The	relative	stability	of 	Weimar	Germany	
came	to	an	abrupt	end	in	1929,	precipitated	by	the	drying	up	of 	foreign	capital	after	the	stock	market	
crash.	In	the	ensuing	years,	massive	unemployment	(5.5	million	in	1931)	and	concerns	about	how	to	fix	the	
spiraling	economic	depression	fueled	the	rapid	radicalization	of 	the	political	body	towards	the	communist	
and	national	socialist	parties,	on	the	left	and	right	respectively.	Growing	social	unrest	took	the	form	of 	an	
increase	in	street	fighting,	and	found	its	fruition	in	the	majority	of 	the	Reichstag	being	composed	of 	repre-
sentatives	of 	radical	parties	seeking	the	overthrow	of 	the	government.	And	in	1933,	Adolf 	Hitler	and	the	
Nazi	party	accomplished	the	overthrow	of 	the	democratic	Weimar	government,	setting	themselves	up	as	
the	absolute	authority	not	only	over	German	political	decisions,	but	increasingly,	over	cultural	policies	and	
artistic	practices.
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Merzbau: 1933-1937
	 Documentation	on	the	work	is	severely	lacking	after	1933,	due	in	large	part	to	the	political	climate:	
his	normally	voluminous	correspondence	with	friends	became	scant,	and	he	found	it	harder	and	harder	to	
exhibit,	perform,	or	publish	his	magazine.	As	such,	it	will	become	necessary	to	situate	the	piece	more	and	
more	in	terms	of 	Schwitters’s	life	and	times.	It	is	within	this	political	climate	that	Schwitters	changed,	as	
reflected	in	a	letter	written	by	his	wife	in	1933,	the	title	of 	the	KdeE	to	the	Merzbau.	This	renaming	signals	
several	things:	first,	that	though	he	saw	in	1931	his	work	as	complete,	he	knew	that	it	had	since	become	
impossible	to	exhibit	it,	and	responded	by	trying	to	think	of 	how	his	work	could	be	further	expanded;	
second,	that	he	had	given	up	his	overtly	private	attempts	to	deal	with	his	“erotic	misery”	and	became	more	
interested	in	pure	construction;	and	third,	that	his	blossoming	career	as	an	artist	and	poet	had	suddenly	
come	to	a	public	end,	and	he	needed	a	way	to	funnel	his	creative	energies	into	something	besides	his	Merz	
pictures	and	poems,	which	he	was	also	unable	to	exhibit.	The	first	and	third	are,	essentially,	related	to	one	
another	and	to	Hitler’s	ascent	to	power,	as	art	in	Germany	became	increasingly	under	Nazi	control.	What	
was	not	condoned	as	hygienic,	German	art,	was	systematically	marginalized–that	is,	anything	that	would	
now	be	considered	the	avant-garde,	along	with	Schwitters’s	works,	were	not	only	denied	exhibition	space,	
but	their	creators	were	similarly	persecuted.	It	is	indicative	of 	the	prevailing	mood	that	not	only	did	Schwit-
ters	undertake	the	immense	task	of 	committing	his	entire	literary	oeuvre	to	memory,	but	he	also	whitewashed	
the	windows	of 	his	house	from	the	inside.	Each	of 	these	manifests	the	extent	to	which	he	felt	threatened	by	
the	changing	political	circumstances,	and	reflect	an	increasing	movement	inwards	in	his	artistic	practice,	
for	he	could	not	allow	his	works	to	fall	into	unfriendly	hands,	as	any	discovery	could	potentially	send	him	
to	prison.	He	was,	moreover,	in	contact	with	a	number	of 	people	about	the	possibility	of 	his	emigration	to	
the	United	States,	but	there	were	several	important	considerations	that	delayed	this	process	until	it	would	
no	longer	be	possible:	he	was	hesitant	to	leave	Hanover,	and	the	house	he	had	lived	in	for	most	of 	his	life	
(nearly	40	years	in	1933);	moreover,	he	did	not	want	to	abandon	what	he	considered	his	life’s	work,	the	Mer-
zbau,	to	be	found	and	destroyed	by	the	Nazis	in	his	absence;	and	finally,	it	is	likely	he	simply	did	not	want	to	
face	the	reality	of 	the	situation.	As	well,	he	felt	more	and	more	cut	off 	from	the	circle	of 	avant-garde	artists	
he	had	collaborated	with	and	drew	strength	from	in	the	20’s,	most	of 	whom	had	since	either	emigrated,	
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went	into	hiding	(as	per	Hannah	Höch),	or,	as	in	the	case	of 	Doesburg,	died	in	1931	of 	a	heart	attack.	
	 All	these	developments,	however,	propelled	Schwitters	to	undertake	the	construction	of 	the	Merzbau	
in	a	more	purposeful	and	concentrated	manner,	and	the	project	underwent	a	dramatic	expansion	over	the	
next	three	years.	Whereas	the	single	room	of 	his	studio	had	been	sufficient	for	the	KdeE,	the	work	eventu-
ally	expanded	out	into	8	of 	the	house’s	rooms,	up	into	the	attic,	and	down	into	the	foundation,	as	much	to	
say	that	“the	Merzbau	.	.	.	did	in	fact	stretch,	after	thirteen	years	of 	building,	from	the	subterranean	to	the	
sky”	(Gamard	94-95).	It	should	be	seen	as	an	ironic	twist	of 	fate–leaning	heavily	towards	the	tragic	and	
absurd–that	the	majority	of 	the	Merzbau	was	built	not	only	during,	but	in	many	ways	directly	caused	by,	the	
rise	of 	the	Third	Reich	and	its	oppressive	cultural	policies,	such	to	say	that	the	growing	confinement	of 	and	
discrimination	against	abstract	artists	led	Schwitters	to,	in	a	sense,	try	and	free	himself 	from	that	confine-
ment	by	turning	his	home	into	a	piece	of 	abstract	art	itself.	It	is	ironic,	of 	course,	because	the	Nazis	would	
have	never	tolerated	such	a	work	or	its	artist	had	it	been	discovered,	and	tragic	because	it	could	never	be	
shown:	“I	can’t	show	my	studio	to	anyone	of 	course	.	.	.	It	saddens	me	so”	(Webster	270).	It	is,	moreover,	a	
testament	to	the	limited	information	we	have	on	the	work	that	the	only	surviving	photographs,	aside	from	a	
few	taken	in	1932,	are	from	1930,	six	years	before	he	stopped	working	on	it.	
	 As	1937	approached,	the	authorities	interested	themselves	more	and	more	with	the	goings-on	of 	the	
Schwitters	household,	in	this	case	not	only	due	to	his	affiliation	with	Dada	and	abstract	art	but	also	because	
of 	his	son	Ernst’s	growingly	vocal	disdain	for	the	Hitlerjugend.	Towards	the	end	of 	1936,	it	became	increas-
ingly	dangerous	for	either	him	or	his	son	to	remain	in	Germany,	and	so	in	January	of 	the	following	year	
he	emigrated	to	Norway,	leaving	his	wife	Helma	to	look	after	numerous	paintings	and	collages,	his	mother	
who	was	still	living	at	Waldhausenstrasse	5,	and,	of 	course,	his	precious	Merzbau.	Gwendolyn	Webster	char-
acterizes	these	final	days	this	way:
Before	leaving	Kurt	spent	two	days	photographing	the	Merzbau	[work	which	has	been	lost]	with	
Ernst	and	in	the	process	took	a	fresh	and	objective	look	at	his	precious	work.	The	Merzbau,	which	
he	liked	to	keep	abreast	of 	the	times,	had	been	neglected	recently.	As	he	gazed	around,	he	saw	that	
there	was	still	plenty	to	work	on.	But	there	was	no	time	now.	(Webster	276)
This	was	especially	true,	as	only	six	months	later	the	infamous	Entartete Kunst	(Degenerate	Art)	exhibition	
would	open	in	Munich,	containing,	as	it	did,	four	of 	Schwitters’s	pieces.	
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Exile and Ruins: 1937-
	 The	following	years	proved	very	trying	ones	for	the	Schwitters.	Helma	spent	most	of 	the	time	in	
Hanover	protecting	Kurt	and	his	Merzbau	from	Gestapo	inquiries	into	his	whereabouts,	taking	care	of 	his	
mother,	the	house,	and	the	numerous	animals	they	kept.	She	was,	in	effect,	the	work’s	guardian,	and	had,	
following	Kurt’s	emigration,	blockaded	the	door	into	the	Merzbau.	Kurt	and	his	son	spent	their	time	liv-
ing	in	a	small	fishing	hut	outside	Oslo,	where	Schwitters	began	work	on	a	new	transportable	Merzbau,	the	
Haus am Bakken,	or	House	on	the	Hill.	He	also	attempted	to	renew	contact	with	his	friends	outside	Ger-
many	regarding	possibilities	for	exhibiting	his	work	and,	with	Katherine	Dreier,	his	chances	of 	securing	
emigration	to	the	United	States.	He	remained	hopeful,	writing	to	Dreier	that	“I	am	building	a	new	studio	
as	a	visible	sign	that	a	new	life	is	beginning	for	me	.	.	.	It	has	to	begin,	I’m	only	fifty	years	old,	one	can	begin	
again	at	that	age.	In	all,	life	is	so	cruel	that	one	shouldn’t	have	been	born.	With	this	premise	one	can	live	ex-
tremely	well”	(Webster	284).	The	authorities	in	Norway	had	recently	become	distrustful	of 	German	nation-
als,	and,	coupled	with	his	hesitant	and	passive	attitude	to	the	entire	emigration	process,	together	combined	
to	delay	the	processing	of 	his	emigration	papers.	
	 The	question	would	soon	become	a	moot	one,	however,	as	he	was	forced	to	flee	Norway	in	1940	
as	the	Wehrmacht	invaded	and	occupied	Norway.	Once	again	compelled	to	abandon	his	Merz	building,	
Schwitters	was	at	least	able	to	secure	transportation	to	Great	Britain	on	a	fishing	boat.	He	spent	the	next	
year	in	an	internment	camp	on	the	Isle	of 	Man	making	sculptures	out	of 	porridge,	painting	portraits	of 	the	
British	officers,	and	attempting	to	find	news	of 	his	wife	before	being	released	in	November	1941.	He	took	
up	residence	in	London	and,	to	pay	for	rent	and	food,	worked	furiously	on	portrait	commissions.	Commu-
nications	with	his	wife	were	extremely	limited	due	to	the	fact	that	their	letters	now	had	to	go	through	the	
intermediary	of 	a	friend	in	neutral	Switzerland,	and	were	under	scrutiny	by	the	censors	in	Germany.	
	 This	complicated	and	somewhat	unreliable	method	led	to	Schwitters	learning	almost	simultane-
ously	in	1944	of 	both	his	wife’s	death	from	cancer	and	the	destruction	of 	Waldhausenstrasse	5,	and,	along	
with	it,	the	Hanover	Merzbau.	“His	immediate	reaction	was	one	of 	numbed	calm”,	writes	Webster.
Though	so	far	away	from	Helma,	he	wrote	back	to	Hagenbach,	he	had	been	so	close	to	her	that	he	
had	known	instinctively	that	she	was	no	longer	alive	.	.	.	As	for	the	Merzbau,	well,	it	was	dead	and	
gone,	like	the	era	it	had	stood	for:	so	what?	‘It	is	sad	of 	course,	but	more	for	others	than	for	myself.’	
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It	was	the	reaction	of 	one	under	severe	shock.	Losses	such	as	these	were	too	much	to	grasp.	(Webster	
349)
Everything,	in	fact,	was	unraveling	in	Schwitters’s	life:	he	could	not	visit	his	friends	in	Europe	because	he	
would	first	need	to	get	British	citizenship;	relatively	few	galleries	in	London	would	exhibit	his	assemblages	nor	
could	he	paint	landscapes	and	portraits	according	to	the	British	taste;	and,	what	is	more,	life	in	exile	had	
taken	its	toll	on	his	health:	he	suffered	a	stroke	in	April,	and	was	having	difficulty	recovering	from	it.	Such	
to	say	that	it	is	no	short	of 	a	miracle	he	did	not,	upon	hearing	the	news	of 	his	wife’s	death	and	the	destruc-
tion	of 	his	life’s	work,	die	himself.	
	 The	majority	of 	the	work	was	destroyed	in	an	air	raid,	October	1943,	and,	what	with	Schwitters	in-
ability	to	return	to	Hanover	due	to	British	visa	regulations,	his	declining	health,	and	his	growing	conviction	
that	he	could	no	longer	think	of 	Germany	as	his	homeland,	he	would	never	return	to	Hanover	to	witness	
for	himself 	the	extent	of 	the	damage.	And	though	he	“was	now	willing	Waldhausenstrasse	into	existence	
with	all	his	might”	(368),	both	on	account	of 	his	personal	desire	to	save	anything	at	all	of 	the	Merzbau,	as	
much	as	because	the	Museum	of 	Modern	Art	in	New	York	had	offered	a	substantial	grant	to	rebuild	it,	
it	had	since	become	a	lost	cause.	As	a	close	friend	wrote	to	him	in	1947	in	response	to	his	worries	over	it,	
“there	is	nothing	left	to	save	of 	your	Merzbau,	not	even	ruins”	(Webster	371),	as	what	had	not	been	de-
stroyed	in	the	bombing	had	been	left	exposed	to	the	elements	for	four	years.
	 The	war	had	since	ended,	and,	politically,	historically,	it	would	be	the	Allies	proclaimed	the	victors.	
Nevertheless,	it	was	a	hollow	victory,	as
From	Kurt’s	standpoint	.	.	.	he	considered	what	he	called	the	trinity	of 	destruction–Hitler,	Goering	
and	Goebbels–as	the	true	victors,	not	militarily	but	in	the	sense	that	they	had	destroyed	a	great	Euro-
pean	renaissance,	an	avant-garde	‘with	a	function,	a	unity	and	a	vital	core’.	(Webster	382)
He	had	not,	of 	course,	been	the	only	victim	of 	the	Third	Reich,	and	here	he	gives	recognition	to	the	
dozens	of 	other	artists–not	to	mention	the	millions	of 	private	citizens–who	had	been	forced	into	exile	or	
imprisoned	before	and	during	the	war,	their	works	smashed,	cut,	burned,	destroyed,	as	much	as	to	say,	their	
lives	as	well.	He	was	himself 	a	casualty	of 	the	war,	just	as	much	as	his	beloved	Merzbau	or	any	combatant,	
prisoner	of 	war,	or	oppressed	populace.
	 He	spent	the	last	years	of 	his	life	in	Ambleside,	Great	Britain,	painting	portraits	and	working	on	yet	
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another	Merz	building,	the	Merz	Barn,	with	Harry	Pierce.	His	health	had	at	this	point	begun	to	rapidly	
deteriorate,	and	he	died	in	1948.	As	for	the	Haus am Bakken,	it	also	was	destroyed,	but	by	children	playing	
with	matches	in	1951.	The	scant	amount	of 	work	he	was	able	to	do	on	the	Merz	Barn,	a	single	unfinished	
wall,	was	moved	to	the	University	of 	Newcastle.	Finally,	in	1981-83	a	reconstruction	of 	one	of 	the	rooms	
of 	the	Hanover	Merzbau	was	completed	with	help	from	Ernst,	and	exists	in	the	Sprengel	Museum	in	Ha-
nover,	though	“visitors	are	liable	to	be	disappointed	by	the	replica	.	.	.	There	is	no	life,	no	struggle,	no	sense	
of 	continuity	.	.	.	It	is	of 	historical	interest,	but	remains	a	mere	fossil,	for	the	grottoes	are	empty”	(Webster	
399).	
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Remembrance
	 It	is	at	this	point	that	I	would	like	to	tie	some	loose	ends,	retrace	my	steps,	and	offer	a	few	more	re-
marks	about	the	work	itself 	that	would	have	been	difficult	to	insert	earlier	on.	These	are	not,	however,	small	
or	unimportant	errata,	but	have	been	left	until	now	in	order	to	lay	a	kind	of 	foundation	for	the	theoretical	
project	that	will	soon	follow.	It	may	seem	that	there	is	little	to	say	about	the	work	after	1933,	given	the	rela-
tive	brevity	afforded	to	its	discussion	in	contrast	to	the	more	sustained	interest	in	the	political	climate	and	
his	personal	movement	through	it.	To	an	extent,	this	is	true,	if 	only	because	the	documentation	of 	the	work	
from	this	time	is	very	limited.	But	the	reason	for	this	is	that	in	all	likelihood	Schwitters	once	more	altered	
the	aim	of 	his	work,	this	time	returning	to	a	similar	approach	as	he	had	had	in	1924,	that	is,	an	increas-
ingly	private	exploration	of 	his	place	in	the	world.	Just	as	he	had	been	hesitant	to	reveal	the	KdeE	publicly	
until	he	was	fairly	confident	it	had	been	finished,	and,	what	goes	hand	in	hand,	that	it	was	something	that	
he	could	see	as	being	exhibited,	it	is	altogether	likely	that	he	began	to	see	the	Merzbau	as	“Unfinished	out	of 	
principle”	(Deitrich	166)	and,	therefore,	not	yet	ready	to	be	properly	documented.	The	photographs	taken	
before	his	exile	attest	to	this	fact,	as	they	were	taken	not	out	of 	a	sense	of 	security	in	the	work’s	comple-
tion,	but	out	of 	a	desire	to	save	what	could	be	saved.	It	can	only	be	assumed	that	the	dynamism	that	had	
always	been	present	in	the	work	was	then	being	taken	to	its	logical	extreme,	and	necessitated	the	daily,	if 	
not	minutely,	adjustment	of 	its	pieces	and	their	relations	to	one	another,	much	like	the	problem	of 	Borges’s	
Funes	who	cannot	comprehend	having	the	same	word	for	a	dog	seen	from	the	front	as	from	the	side.	It	re-
mains	a	speculative	assertion,	but	if 	it	was	in	fact	Schwitters’s	intention	to	create	“	a	living,	daily-changing	
document”	as	was	Richter’s	assessment	10	years	prior,	then	the	ultimate	result	of 	such	a	project	is	one	that	
could,	in	principle,	never	be	finished,	one	that	would	require	the	perpetual	reorganization	of 	and	addition	
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to	its	materials	in	order	to	reflect	the	changing	climate	of 	the	world	and,	moreover,	of 	Schwitters	himself.
	 Along	these	lines,	we	can	see	Schwitters	as	the	artist	and	creator	of 	the	Merzbau,	but	it	is	much	more	
fruitful	to	see	him	as	its	principal	subject	and	material.	As	the	Total-Merz-Work-of-Art,	it	would	be	only	
natural	to	include	the	creator	within	the	work	itself,	especially	considering	its	location	within	his	family	
home.	The	found	materials	pasted	to	the	walls,	the	plaster	and	paint	and	nails,	were	of 	course	an	important	
component	of 	the	work,	but	in	theater-like	fashion,	him,	his	wife,	his	son,	their	numerous	mice,	guinea	pigs	
and	other	animals–even	Schwitters’s	relatively	few	visitors	during	this	time–all	became	actors	on	his	Merz	
stage.	When	seen	this	way,	the	work	suddenly	transforms	again,	from	collage,	to	sculpture,	to	column,	to	
architecture,	and	finally,	to	theater.	After	each	successive	transformation	of 	genre,	the	work	lifts	itself 	out	of 	
its	predecessor	and	simultaneously	denies	it:	a	collage	is	too	flat,	a	sculpture	too	individual;	a	column	is	fine	
if 	it	is	supporting	something,	but	absurd	any	other	way;	a	house	is	beautiful,	perhaps,	but	needs	the	pres-
ence	of 	human	subjects;	finally,	it	becomes	theater,	where	everything	imaginable	comes	into	place	as	artistic	
material.	
	 If 	there	is	a	fruitful	way	of 	seeing	the	culmination	of 	the	Merzbau’s	over	thirteen	years	of 	construc-
tion,	then	it	is,	as	was	his	motivation	in	1920,	as	theater.	The	assembly	of 	all	materials	for	artistic	means,	
which,	for	Kurt,	meant	principally	the	assembly	of 	all	discarded	materials,	plastered	and	painted	over,	finds	
its	expression	in	the	assembly	also	of 	discarded	human	beings,	the	cultural	waste	of 	an	oppressive	society.	
As	Germany	became	more	and	more	totalitarian,	the	Schwitters	responded	by	living	their	lives	in	the	mi-
lieu	of 	an	ever-changing,	ever-expanding	stage,	concealed	from	the	world	but	greater	than	it.	Such	to	say,	
that	any	documentation	of 	the	work	from	its	final	years	must	ultimately	be	seen	as	trivial,	not	only	because	
of 	the	dynamism	of 	its	surface,	but	also	because	of 	the	dynamism	of 	its	inhabitants	and	the	world	it	peered	
out	at	as	through	a	looking	glass.
	
L’art pour l’art
	 The	theoretical	armature	with	which	I	am	attempting	an	aesthetic	rescue	of 	the	Merzbau	must	
now	be	assembled.	I	would	like	to	begin,	then,	by	resurrecting	some	of 	the	debate	over	the	concept	of 	the	
autonomy	of 	art,	specifically	as	it	is	taken	up	in	the	aesthetic	philosophies	of 	Walter	Benjamin	and	Peter	
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Bürger,	Herbert	Marcuse	and	Theodor	Adorno.	Each	of 	these	thinkers	has,	of 	course,	their	own	concerns	
above	and	outside	the	question	of 	art’s	autonomy	from	society,	and	many	of 	the	more	important	ideas	I	
would	like	to	draw	into	this	project	result	from	these	further	concerns.	The	autonomy	of 	art,	however,	is	a	
running	current	and	foundational	element	for	each	of 	their	individual	critiques	of 	art’s	function:	it	is	the	
spine,	the	cornerstone,	the	heart	that	circulates	the	blood.	This	debate	must,	therefore,	be	given	due	atten-
tion,	as	everything	necessarily	follows	from	a	clear	understanding	of 	their	positions	and	rationale	for	those	
positions.	In	an	effort	to	allow	their	positions	to	be	developed	as	clearly	as	possible,	I	will	refrain	here	from	
incorporating	a	sustained	comparison	to	the	Merzbau.	I	will,	however,	be	sure	to	point	to	these	comparisons	
where	applicable.
	 I	am	interested	in	characterizing	this	debate	here,	then,	primarily	in	terms	of 	art’s	capacity	to	
reject,	abolish,	and	overcome	Fascism,	or	what	is	equivalent,	a	totalizing	and	inherently	unequal	culture:	
as	Benjamin	is	only	too	clear,	his	theory	of 	reproducibility	is	governed	by	the	credo	of 	developing	concepts	
“completely	useless	for	the	purposes	of 	Fascism”	(Benjamin	“The	work	of 	art	.	.	.	“	218).	The	rejection	
of 	Fascism	necessarily	follows	and	is	dependent	on	the	conviction,	held	by	each	of 	these	thinkers,	that	art	
is	the	method	through	which	humanity	can	be	liberated	from	oppression	in	anticipation	of 	“a	spirit	that	
would	only	then	step	forth”	(Adorno	29).	The	choice	of 	Fascism	has	a	second	purpose,	for	it	is	through	that	
lens	that	the	Merzbau	comes	into	existence	and,	moreover,	at	the	hands	of 	which	is	destroyed.	There	are	two	
distinct	sides	to	this	debate,	of 	which	the	first	seeks	to	collapse	the	distance	between	art	and	social	praxis–
vis.	Benjamin	and	Bürger–or	in	other	words,	to	destroy	art’s	autonomy	in	the	creation	of 	a	socially	useful	
and	socially	responsible	art.	The	second	position,	conversely,	sees	“the	political	potential	of 	art	in	art	itself ”	
(Marcuse	The Aesthetic Dimension),	problematic	as	art’s	autonomy	must	necessarily	appear	if 	art	is	taken	to	
have	a	liberating	function.	
	 This	liberation,	influenced	as	it	is	by	historical	materialism,	is	an	invocation	of 	a	specifically	mate-
rial	one.	Though	their	theories	are	fraught	with	parallels	to	spiritualism	through	their	returns	to	ideas	of 	
redemption	and	reconciliation,	the	difference	between	their	conception	of 	a	material	liberation	and	a	spiri-
tual	one	is	drawn	clearly	by	Marcuse’s	denunciation	of 	philosophy,	writing:
In	view	of 	the	meager	development	of 	the	productive	forces	in	the	ancient	economy,	it	never	oc-
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curred	to	philosophy	that	material	practice	could	ever	be	fashioned	in	such	a	way	that	it	would	itself 	
contain	the	space	and	time	for	happiness.	(Marcuse	The Essential Marcuse	208)
Adorno,	much	more	the	pessimist	of 	the	two,	brings	the	same	argument	to	bear	against	the	modern	world:	
This	is	the	true	consciousness	of 	an	age	in	which	the	real	possibility	of 	utopia–that	given	the	level	of 	
productive	forces	the	earth	could	here	and	now	be	paradise–converges	with	the	possibility	of 	total	
catastrophe.	(Adorno	33)
In	each	case,	the	possibility	of 	paradise,	that	is,	a	material	order	that	could	guarantee	happiness,	is	frustrat-
ed	by	a	problem	in	the	prevailing	world	view	and	practice	of 	capitalism,	which	creates	the	material	condi-
tions	necessary	for	liberation	while	simultaneously	disallowing	its	practice.	Marcuse	blames	the	humanism	
of 	bourgeois	society:
.	.	.	the	bourgeois	liberation	of 	the	individual	made	possible	a	new	happiness.
	 But	the	universality	of 	this	happiness	is	immediately	canceled,	since	the	abstract	equality	of 	
men	realizes	itself 	in	capitalist	production	as	concrete	inequality.	(Marcuse	209)
Adorno	maintains	as	much,	linking	the	dilemma	to	the	unanimous	appraisal	of 	commodities	through	
exchange	value,	which	creates	the	illusion	of 	equality	(insofar	as	everything	is	given	a	comparable	value	in	
the	market)	and	thus	conceals	the	real	inequality	inherent	in	a	universal	system	of 	value:	it	is	a	false	equal-
ity	because	it	equates	the	value	of 	a	machine	with	the	value	of 	a	man’s	labor,	the	value	of 	a	woman	and	the	
clothes	she	wears.	As	I	made	such	pains	to	express	earlier,	Merz	art	seeks	to	develop	an	aesthetic	of 	equality	
through	the	incorporation	of 	refuse	and	fragment,	and	should	be	understood	in	terms	of 	this	theoretical	
interest	in	equality.
	 Benjamin’s	theory	of 	reproducibility	is	an	attempt	at	overcoming	the	inherent	inequality	of 	capi-
talism–and	its	culmination	in	Fascism–by	proposing	a	theory	of 	art	in	which	its	experience	is	no	longer	
dependent	on	an	appreciation	of 	a	work’s	authority,	or	aura,	but	dependent	on	the	possibility	of 	its	mass	
enjoyment.	He	is,	of 	course,	responding	to	the	exploitation	of 	the	mass	media	by	the	Nazis,	whose	fulfill-
ment	is	“The	violation	of 	the	masses,	whom	Fascism,	with	its	Führer	cult,	forces	to	their	knees”	(Benjamin	
“The	work	of 	art	.	.	.	“	241).	The	aura	of 	the	unique	work	of 	art	culminates	in	the	person	of 	Hitler,	who	
stands	at	an	unapproachable	distance	demanding,	by	force	of 	his	authority,	the	conflation	of 	uniqueness	
with	unimpeachable	power.	In	response,	Benjamin	appropriates	photography	and	film	as	the	weapons	by	
which	an	aesthetic	of 	authority	can	be	fought	by	virtue	of 	reproduction,	enabling	the	satisfaction	of 	“the	
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desire	of 	contemporary	masses	to	bring	things	‘closer’	spatially	and	humanly,	which	is	just	as	ardent	as	their	
bent	toward	overcoming	the	uniqueness	of 	every	reality	by	accepting	its	reproduction”	(223).	By	positing	
an	experience	of 	art	as	an	experience	of 	equality,	ultimately	what	should	develop	is	a	“’sense	of 	the	univer-
sal	equality	of 	things’”,	one,	moreover,	“which	has	increased	to	such	a	degree	that	it	extracts	it	even	from	a	
unique	object	by	means	of 	reproduction”	(223).	The	denial	of 	uniqueness	afforded	by	reproduction	is	cor-
related	to	a	denial	of 	the	inherent	oppression	of 	the	“Fuhrer	cult”	and	its	necessary	creation	of 	hierarchical	
power	structures,	as	much	to	say,	that	the	perception	of 	the	equality	of 	things	finds	expression	in	the	devel-
opment	of 	a	sense	of 	the	true	equality	of 	men.	This	is	a	true	sense	of 	equality	because	it	does	not	univer-
salize	the	way	value	is	assigned,	but	rather	that	value	as	a	universal	drops	out	to	be	replaced	by	a	perception	
of 	a	whole	permanently	fragmented	in	its	experience:	the	work	of 	art	is	no	longer	experienced	as	a	relation	
of 	authority,	but	as	an	experience	of 	a	singularity	within	the	larger	totality;	or,	that	in	the	Merzbau	the	mate-
rial	dross	of 	reproduced	society	is	taken	out	of 	its	economic	context	and	transformed	into	an	experience	of 	
an	aesthetic	singularity	within	the	work.
	 He	is	thus	committed	to	an	idea	of 	art’s	entrance	into	the	social	order	rather	than	its	separation	
from	it,	convinced	that	the	principle	of 	art’s	autonomy	“culminates	in	one	thing:	war”	(241).	War	is	the	
fulfillment	of 	an	aesthetic	of 	authority	because	it	results	in	“the	introduction	of 	aesthetics	into	political	life”	
(241)	and,	by	extension,	the	aesthetisization	of 	war:	“Fascism	.	.	.	expects	war	to	supply	the	artistic	gratifi-
cation	of 	a	sense	perception	that	has	been	changed	by	technology.	This	is	evidently	the	consummation	of 	
‘l’art pour l’art’”	(242).	But	I	would	caution	us	from	taking	his	conclusion	at	face	value:	what	is	interesting	
about	this	connection	for	me	is	the	inherently	political	value	of 	art,	as	culminating	in	war,	or	in	liberation.	
The	exact	mechanism	can	be	disputed	later.
	 Peter	Bürger	likewise	posits,	in	his	Theory of  the Avant-Garde,	that	art	must	find	its	way	into	the	daily	
praxis	of 	society.	He	claims	this	on	the	grounds	that	autonomous	art	is	“the	objectification	of 	the	self-un-
derstanding	of 	the	bourgeois	class”	(Bürger	47);	what	this	means	for	him	is	that,	as	only	self-understanding,	
bourgeois	art	is	incapable	of 	affecting	the	way	in	which	life	is	lived	because	it	only	maintains	the	ideological	
exigencies	of 	bourgeois	society.	It	would	be	unfair	to	autonomous	art,	within	Bürger’s	understanding	of 	it,	
to	suggest	that	it	does	not	function	as	a	protest	against	a	bad	society,	for	art’s	separation	from	society	neces-
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sarily	forms	it	as	the	body	capable	of 	critiquing	society:	its	separation	allows	for	art	to	objectively	look	at	
society,	granting	it	a	privileged	perspective	on	society’s	inherent	inequality.	Autonomous	art,	however,	“by	
realizing	the	image	of 	a	better	order	in	fiction,	which	is	semblance	(Schein)	only,	.	.	.	relieves	the	existing	
society	of 	the	pressure	of 	those	forces	that	make	for	change”	(58).	That	is,	by	projecting	the	positive	values	
of 	the	culture	onto	art,	which	is	removed	from	society,	those	values	are	in	turn	also	removed	from	society,	
and	can	therefore	have	no	practical	value	in	creating	social	change;	or,	as	he	expresses	it,	the	function	of 	art	
in	bourgeois	society	is	“the	neutralization	of 	critique”	(13).	The	problem	is	perhaps	best	exemplified	by	his	
tacit	accusation	of 	historians	and	critics,	who	“Whether	they	want	to	or	not	.	.	.	hold	a	position	in	the	social	
disputes	of 	their	time.	The	perspective	from	which	they	view	their	subject	is	determined	by	the	position	
they	occupy	among	the	social	forces	of 	the	epoch”	(Bürger	6):	just	as	the	historian	and	critic	is	essentially	al-
ready	caught	within	the	net	of 	social	forces	and	must	therefore	stand	in	a	critical	relation	to	them	from	that	
inherent	collusion,	so	must	the	artist	create	art	in	recognition	of 	his	social	culpability.
	 The	telos	of 	avant-garde	art,	specifically	Dada	and	Surrealist	art	for	Bürger,	is,	in	distinction	to	
autonomous	art,	then,	“the	attempt	to	organize	a	new	life	praxis	from	a	basis	in	art”	(49).	This	is	achievable	
for	him	principally	through	the	artistic	practice	of 	montage,	for	in	montage	the	division	between	art	and	
fiction	is	broken	down:	the	fragments	of 	montage	are	“no	longer	signs	pointing	to	reality,	they	are	reality”	
(78).	Two	important	corollaries	to	Schwitters’s	work	apply	here:	insofar	as	his	is	an	art	of 	fragments,	it	is	
also	one	in	which	the	fragment	is	given	a	place	within	the	praxis	of 	his	own	daily	life,	incorporated	into	his	
home	and	workspace.	Bürger	writes	elsewhere	that	“For	avant-gardistes	.	.	.	material	is	just	that,	material	.	
.	.	the	avant-gardiste	tears	it	out	of 	the	life	totality,	isolates	it,	and	turns	it	into	a	fragment”	(70).	The	use	of 	
fragments	severs	them	from	an	existing	totalizing	society	and	discovers	a	new	use	for	them,	that	is,	as	art.	
By	subjecting	the	fragments	of 	society	to	the	effects	of 	a	reorganization	through	aesthetic	form,	montage	
regains	its	ability	to	critique	society	because	it	signals,	in	effect,	the	transformation	of 	society	from	its	very	
base,	its	material,	by	questioning	the	universal	values	of 	that	society,	of 	which	the	Merzbau	should	be	viewed	
as	such	a	reorganization.	
	 In	an	attempt	to	better	characterize	Bürger’s	claims,	we	will	have	to	turn	our	attention	to	Herbert	
Marcuse’s	thoughts	on	art	and	culture,	as	a	number	of 	Bürger’s	principal	claims	draw	on	Marcuse’s	1937	
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essay	“The	Affirmative	Character	of 	Culture.”	The	self-understanding	of 	the	bourgeois	class	and	the	rel-
egation	of 	positive	values	to	art	are	expressed	by	Marcuse	in	terms	of 	the	soul,	which	functions	as	the	realm	
of 	transcendent	unity	and	freedom	within	bourgeois	culture.	Composed	of 	“the	purposeless	and	beautiful”	
(Marcuse	The Essential Marcuse	208),	it	finds	its	proper	expression	in	art:	“The	unity	represented	by	art,”	he	
goes	on	to	say,	“and	the	pure	humanity	of 	its	persons	are	unreal;	they	are	the	counterimage	of 	what	occurs	
in	social	reality”	(213).	Soul	is,	therefore,	the	autonomous	arm	of 	society–expressed	in	art–for	it	acts	as	the	
repository	for	the	humane	ideals	of 	bourgeois	society	and	is	their	“only	still	immaculate	guarantor”	(218).	
This	could	be	seen	as	positive,	for	it	allows	for	“the	critical	and	revolutionary	force	of 	the	ideal”	(213)	to	be	
perpetuated	in	society.	The	perpetuation	of 	that	ideal,	however,	and	the	perpetuation	of 	the	soul	at	large,	
serves	only	“to	excuse	the	poverty,	martyrdom,	and	bondage	of 	the	body	[and]	the	ideological	surrender	
of 	existence	to	the	economy	of 	capitalism”	(218),	because	the	separation	of 	human	values	from	daily	life	
excuses	the	material	order	from	incorporating	and	expressing	them	in	the	physical	welfare	of 	people.	This	
thus	allows	only	for	the	perpetuation	of 	inequality	and	oppression	for	Marcuse,	as	he	believes	that	“mate-
rial	practice	could	be	fashioned	in	such	a	way	that	it	would	itself 	contain	the	space	and	time	for	happiness”	
(208),	thus	effectively	aligning	himself 	against	autonomous	art.	Schwitters	art	could,	I	believe,	be	seen	as	an	
attempt	at	creating	happiness	through	the	material	practice	of 	art,	in	which	the	humane	ideals	of 	society	
are	problematized	by	specific	formal	and	material	concerns	in	the	Merzbau.
	 Marcuse	complicates	his	thinking	on	the	autonomy	of 	art,	however,	in	The Aesthetic Dimension,	pub-
lished	in	1978.	Here,	it	is	principally	because	art	is	separated	from	the	means-end	rationality	of 	capital-
ist	society	that	it	is	able	to	provide	an	alternate	reality.	As	he	writes,	“The	autonomy	of 	art	contains	the	
categorical	imperative:	‘things	must	change’”	(The Aesthetic Dimension	13).	But	this	should	not	be	seen	as	an	
about-face	for	Marcuse,	but	rather	as	a	continuation	of 	his	earlier	thought	through	a	different	emphasis	on	
how	art	functions	in	relation	to	society.	The	difference	can	be	summarized	as	a	change	in	the	way	in	which	
art	is	autonomous.	One	could	in	fact	see	his	claims	in	“The	Affirmative	Character	of 	Culture”	as	suggest-
ing	that	art,	as	the	vestigial	arm	of 	bourgeois	ideals,	is	in	reality	implicit	in	society	and	exists	thus	as	a	care-
fully	prepared	reservation	within	society	for	those	ideals;	when	he	claims,	therefore,	in	The Aesthetic Dimension	
that	the	political	potential	of 	art	is	in	art	itself,	we	must	see	this	as	an	affirmation	of 	art’s	autonomy.	The	
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Merzbau’s	inclusion	in	the	home,	as	much	as	its	inability	to	be	exhibited,	similarly	forces	the	work	outside	
of 	the	means-end	reality	of 	capitalist	society	and	implicates	it	as	autonomous.	This	means	for	Marcuse	
principally	a	commitment	to	functionally	autonomous	art:	not	merely	a	counterimage,	art’s	“critical	politi-
cal	potential	.	.	.	asserts	itself 	precisely	in	the	sublimation	of 	the	social	content.	Two	worlds	collide	.	.	.	The	
right	and	wrong	of 	individuals	[in	the	work	of 	art]	confront	social	right	and	wrong”	(27).	This	confronta-
tion	results	in	an	estrangement	from	social	reality,	and	is	motivated	against	the	catastrophe	of 	the	“repro-
duction	and	integration	of 	that	which	is”	(50)–or	in	other	words,	the	material	perpetuation	of 	bourgeois	life	
praxis.	It	is	only	through	art’s	ability	to	provide	an	alternate	reality	that	the	given	reality	becomes	farcical	
and	problematic.	The	Merzbau	is,	I	believe,	such	an	alternate	reality,	pieced	together	from	the	remains	of 	
society	and	thrust	back	against	it.
	 Adorno,	in	his	Aesthetic Theory	published	posthumously	in	1970,	takes	these	lines	of 	thinking	on	the	
autonomy	of 	art	to	an	extreme	by	effectively	questioning	the	validity	of 	art’s	right	to	exist.	He	dismisses	the	
possibility	of 	a	socially	engaged	art	out	of 	hand,	but	is	equally	concerned	about	the	possibility	of 	autono-
mous	art	as	well:	“It	is	self-evident	that	nothing	concerning	art	is	self-evident	anymore,	not	its	inner	life,	
not	its	relation	to	the	world,	not	even	its	right	to	exist”	(Adorno	1).	He	offers	the	wry	ultimatum,	“Either	to	
leave	art	behind	or	to	transform	its	concept”	(61)	in	recognition,	primarily,	of 	the	difficulty	inherent	in	what	
he	sees	as	the	problematic	attempt	to	rescue	art	from	its	exploitation	by	capitalist	society.	That	is,	the	crisis	
facing	art	for	Adorno	is	whether	it	can	overcome	its	complete	commodifacation	without	thereby	dissolving	
its	claims	to	legitimacy;	each	alternative	seems,	therefore,	one	which	must	be	rejected.
	 His	solution	can	best	be	characterized	as	one	in	which	art	must	reject	its	own	concept	to	survive,	
and	yet,	paradoxically,	remain	art:	“doubtless	artworks	became	artworks	only	by	negating	their	origin”	
(3).	The	negation	of 	origins	is	especially	significant,	as	he	sees	the	project	of 	art	as	a	liberating	principle	in	
which	the	oppressive	elements	and	material	inequality	of 	reality	are	negated	and	thus	transformed.	The	
incorporation	of 	found	materials	in	Merz	art	is	a	negation	of 	their	origins	as	material,	and	through	the	
application	of 	aesthetic	form,	Schwitters	imputes	to	them	instead	the	spiritual	qualities	of 	art.	The	auto-
negation	of 	art	propels	Adorno’s	critique	to	adopt	the	negation	of 	nature	and	of 	society	into	art	as	well,	
such	that	art	functions	primarily	as	a	negative	response.	The	negation	of 	society	by	art	can	be	compared	to	
31
the	negation	of 	society	by	utopia:	each	presents	what	is	not,	but	“because	the	nonexistent	appears	it	must	
indeed	be	possible”	(82).	The	appearance	of 	the	nonexistent	thus	presages	its	coming,	and,	thus,	the	com-
ing	of 	utopia,	if 	only	through	the	extension	of 	art’s	principal	essence,	that	is,	of 	showing	the	non-existent	as	
possible	and	thereby	becoming	“qualitatively	transformed	epiphanies”	(80).	
	 Art,	however,	is	in	fact	not	a	vision	of 	utopia	but	“a	form	of 	reaction	that	anticipates	the	apoca-
lypse”	(85).	But	this	anticipation	functions	as	the	way	in	which	art	can	continue	to	critique	society:	“That	
art	enunciates	the	disaster	by	identifying	with	it	anticipates	its	enervation”	(19);	“Art	is	modern	art,”	he	
continues,	“through	mimesis	of 	the	hardened	and	alienated;	only	thereby,	and	not	by	the	refusal	of 	a	mute	
reality,	does	art	become	eloquent”	(21).	The	incorporation	of 	the	reproduced	material	of 	capitalist	produc-
tion	in	the	Merzbau	is	Schwitters’s	attempt	at	such	a	mimesis,	through	which	he	aligns	his	artistic	practice	
with	the	alienated	fragments	of 	material	society.	By	taking	the	apocalypse,	the	alienated	and	hardened	into	
its	own	concept,	art	protests	the	bad	order	by	rejecting	the	position	that	it	should	present	itself 	as	the	privi-
leged	realm	of 	the	humane–for	the	world	is	no	longer	humane,	but	unequal	and	oppressive–and	instead	
adopt	the	goal	of 	forcing	the	confrontation	with	what	is	ugly	and	inhumane.	This	translates	into	an	art	that	
is	cruel	to	the	world	that	is–both	the	natural	world	as	well	as	society–because	it	must	present	itself 	in	oppo-
sition	to	“the	arbitrariness	of 	what	simply	exists”	(5).
	 But	this	negation	is	ultimately	problematic	for	art	itself,	for	it	threatens	to	be	its	death:	insofar	as	
art	remains	the	negation	of 	society,	it	begins	to	preclude	its	own	possibility,	for	it	thus	severs	its	validity	as	
critique.	The	Merzbau	is,	unfortunately,	a	prime	example	of 	what	he	means,	as	its	spiritualization	overcame	
the	political	climate	while	nevertheless	refusing	to	integrate	with	it,	thus	effectively	canceling	its	ability	to	
critique	Nazi	Germany.	Of 	the	different	fates	that	might	await	art	for	Adorno,	the	first	is	art’s	complete	
commodification	and	subsequent	role	of 	affirming	the	illusory	equality	of 	capitalism;	secondly,	in	what	
perhaps	amounts	to	the	same	problem,	art	will	become	completely	spiritualized,	leading	to	the	abolishment	
of 	art’s	necessary	connection	to	the	world.	The	second	possibility	is	certainly	preferable:
It	has	often	been	said	.	.	.	that	in	society	as	a	whole	it	is	art	that	should	introduce	chaos	into	order	
rather	than	the	reverse.	The	chaotic	aspects	of 	qualitatively	new	art	are	opposed	to	order–the	spirit	
of 	order–only	at	first	glance.	They	are	ciphers	of 	a	critique	of 	a	spurious	second	nature:	Order	is	
in	truth	this	chaotic.	The	element	of 	chaos	and	radical	spiritualization	converge	in	the	rejection	of 	
sleekly	polished	images	of 	life	.	.	.	(94-95)
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The	implication	here	that	order	is	in	truth	chaotic	seeks	to	question	and	ultimately	reject	a	totalized	and	
universalized	world,	that	is,	the	world	demanded	by	Fascism.	He	continues,	however,	by	offering	the	main	
dilemma	of 	spiritualized	art:
Yet	however	deep	the	compulsion	may	lie	that	art	divest	itself 	of 	every	trace	of 	being	a	show	.	.	.	art	
no	longer	exists	when	that	element	has	been	totally	eradicated	and	yet	it	is	unable	to	provide	any	
protected	arena	for	that	element;				.	.	.	Whether	the	spiritualization	of 	art	is	capable	of 	this	will	de-
cide	if 	art	survives	or	if 	Hegel’s	prophecy	of 	the	end	of 	art	will	indeed	be	fulfilled,	a	prophecy	that,	
in	the	world	such	as	it	has	become,	amounts	to	the	thoughtless	and–in	the	detestable	sense–realistic	
confirmation	and	reproduction	of 	what	is.	In	this	regard,	the	rescue	of 	art	is	eminently	political,	but	
it	is	also	as	uncertain	in	itself 	as	it	is	threatened	by	the	course	of 	the	world.	(95)
Art,	then,	for	Adorno	is	caught	between	these	two	extremes,	such	that	it	must	always	be	tainted	by	its	other,	
by	society	and	its	attempts	to	commodify	it,	and	its	necessity–and	perhaps	impossibility–to	become	com-
pletely	spiritualized:	or,	in	other	words,	art	is	caught	between	being	subsumed	into	the	social	order,	on	the	
one	hand,	and	moving	more	and	more	towards	autonomy.
	 The	only	real	salvation	for	art	against	a	dehumanizing	world,	however,	remains	as	just	that	impos-
sible	necessity:	for	art	to	become	“radically	spiritualized”	(92).	Adorno	contrasts	the	spiritual	in	art,	identi-
fied	by	him	as	the	apparition,	with	Benjamin’s	concept	of 	the	aura–or	rather,	he	rejects	Benjamin’s	claim	that	
art	can	remain	art	without	the	aura,	for	the	aura	is	“whatever	goes	beyond	its	factual	givenness,	its	content;	
one	cannot	abolish	it	and	still	want	art”	(45).	The	apparition,	then,	is	everything	in	the	work	of 	art	that	does	
not	factually	exist;	but	the	nonexisting	in	art	is	dependent	on	the	assemblage	of 	“fragments	of 	the	exist-
ing”	(83),	which	act	not	only	to	develop	the	spiritual	in	art	but	also	to	disturb	the	work’s	internal	unity.	The	
tendency	of 	art	to	move	simultaneously	towards	and	away	from	unity	inflicts	a	rupture	within	which	the	
apparition	appears,	and	within	which	the	critical	potential	of 	art	rests	in	its	attempt	to	move	towards	a	true	
equality.	I	would	like	to	suggest	in	what	is	to	come	that	the	memory	of 	the	Merzbau	is	just	this	apparition:	the	
breaking	forth	of 	that	which	does	not	exist.
Love/Death: Protest
 Let	us	take	seriously	the	problem	of 	death,	for	we	must	make	some	allowance	for	it,	and,	moreover,	
enact	a	positive	transformation	of 	its	sense	if 	we	are	to	rescue	the	Merzbau.	For	the	work	is,	it	cannot	be	ar-
gued	against,	essentially	dead:	the	documentation	cannot	stand	in	for	the	work	itself,	it	must	be	experienced	
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in	the	fullness	of 	its	presence.	We	must,	therefore,	effect	a	qualitative	shift	in	our	understanding	of 	death,	
specifically	as	it	applies	to	works	of 	art,	because	our	real	work	cannot	begin	otherwise.	And	this	means	that	
we	must	discover	in	the	concept	of 	death	the	perpetuation	of 	the	presence	of 	the	dead.
	 	To	take	a	first	step,	we	should	follow	Adorno	by	interrogating	the	notion	that	art	is	everlasting.	He	
convinces	us	that	by	imputing	permanence	to	art	is	not	only	a	false	conception	of 	what	art	is	and	must	be,	
but	that	such	a	gesture	is,	moreover,	a	foolish	and	hurtful	one	committed	by	the	work	and	its	artist:
Obviously	the	duration	to	which	artworks	aspire	is	modeled	on	fixed,	inheritable	possession;	the	
spiritual	should,	like	material,	become	property,	an	outrage	ineluctably	committed	by	spirit	against	
itself.	As	soon	as	artworks	make	a	fetish	of 	their	hope	of 	duration,	they	begin	to	suffer	from	their	
sickness	unto	death:	The	veneer	of 	inalienability	that	they	draw	over	themselves	at	the	same	time	
suffocates	them.	(28)
No	sooner	has	the	work	of 	art	professed	to	be	eternal	does	it	succumb	to	death.	He	is	correct	to	a	certain	
extent,	as	it	is	true	that	artworks	are	inevitably	perishable;	but	he	has	neglected	to	account	for	how	the	work	
of 	art	attains	its	hoped	for	duration:	Artworks	endure	because	they	continue	to	be	taken	up	by	society	as	
art.	By	way	of 	example,	the	frescoes	on	the	ceiling	of 	the	Sistine	Chapel	are	qualitatively	different	from	
how	Michelangelo	painted	them,	the	effect	of 	restorations	to	the	work	undertaken	in	the	five	centuries	
since.	There	is	some	controversy	on	the	success	of 	these	restorations–notably	the	most	recent	one	com-
pleted	in	1999–but	I	would	here	simply	like	to	suggest	that	the	work	suffers	from	perpetual	decay–that	it	
is,	in	short,	always	moving	towards	death–but	it	is	the	product	of 	these	restorations,	and	the	critical	re-
examination	they	spawn,	that	the	work	continues	to	endure.	The	meaning	of 	his	assertion	that	the	spiritual	
becomes	property	is,	in	effect,	just	this	process	of 	restoration	I	have	described,	with	its	attendant	critical	
problems:	it	is,	as	Adorno	writes,	“an	outrage	ineluctably	committed	by	spirit	against	itself ”;	but	we	should	
keep	in	mind,	however,	that	art	consists	in	just	this	movement,	of 	the	transformation	of 	art’s	concept	by	
negating	that	concept.	It	is	likely	in	the	spiritual	becoming	property	that	artworks	have	any	hope	of 	endur-
ance	at	all,	for	“Through	duration	art	protests	against	death”	(27).	In	this	protest	death	is	inescapable,	for	
“Artworks	have	no	power	over	whether	they	endure”	(27),	but	the	protest	is	nevertheless	significant	because	
art	thus	aligns	itself 	with	the	struggle	against	the	death	of 	the	body	and	of 	the	spirit	inflicted	by	commodifi-
cation.	The	tactic	of 	implicating	the	spiritual	as	property	is	bound	up	with	its	desire	to	be	transmissible,	and	
through	the	fulfillment	of 	that	desire	does	the	work	of 	art	endure.	My	project	must	thus	be	aligned	with	the	
34
transformation	of 	the	Merzbau	into	a	kind	of 	spiritual	property.
	 Benjamin	offers	us	a	second	way	of 	approaching	the	development	of 	such	a	spiritual	property	in	
his	essay	“Unpacking	My	Library.”	He	is	principally	concerned	with	validating	the	passion	of 	collecting:	
“Every	passion”,	he	writes,	“borders	on	the	chaotic,	but	the	collector’s	passion	borders	on	the	chaos	of 	
memories”	(Benjamin	“Unpacking	.	.	.	“	60).	He	continues:	“To	renew	the	old	world–that	is	the	collec-
tor’s	deepest	desire	when	he	is	driven	to	acquire	new	things,	and	that	is	why	the	collector	of 	old	books	is	
closer	to	the	wellsprings	of 	collecting	than	the	acquirer	of 	luxury	additions”	(61).	The	connection	to	Merz	
art	should,	I	hope,	appear	obvious,	that	is,	as	an	art	of 	collecting.	Schwitters’s	art	is	primarily	a	collection	
of 	the	fragments	and	forgotten	dross	of 	material	society	in	the	attempt	to	give	them	new	life	through	an	
aesthetic	transformation,	through	which	it	follows	that	the	characteristics	Benjamin	imputes	to	the	collector	
of 	old	books	must	find	a	place	in	the	validation	of 	Schwitters’s	artistic	project.	Memory,	and	its	objectiva-
tion	in,	on	the	one	hand,	an	old	book,	and,	on	the	other,	the	Merzbau,	must	be	seen	as	two	sides	of 	the	same	
coin.	Therefore,	when	Benjamin	writes:
.	.	.	one	of 	the	finest	memories	of 	a	collector	is	the	moment	when	he	rescued	a	book	to	which	he	
might	never	have	given	a	thought,	much	less	a	wishful	look,	because	he	found	it	lonely	and	aban-
doned	on	the	market	place	and	bought	it	to	give	it	its	freedom	.	.	.	“	(64)	
we	should	see	in	Merz	a	similar	liberating	impulse	in	the	use	of 	the	discarded	and	fragmented	objects	suf-
fusing	his	architectural	assemblage.
	 Benjamin	is	furthermore	clear	on	the	role	of 	property	in	a	collection,	to	which	he	ties	the	impor-
tance	of 	its	transmissibility:
Actually,	inheritance	is	the	soundest	way	of 	acquiring	a	collection.	For	a	collector’s	attitude	towards	
his	possessions	stems	from	an	owner’s	feeling	of 	responsibility	toward	his	property.	Thus	it	is,	in	the	
highest	sense,	the	attitude	of 	an	heir,	and	the	most	distinguished	trait	of 	a	collection	will	always	be	its	
transmissibility.	(66)
This	property	is	spiritualized	in	the	sense	that	it	is	dependent	on	the	accumulation	of 	memories,	of 	the	ac-
cumulation	of 	the	lost	to	grant	them	their	freedom,	to	which	I	reply	that	I	see	not	only	Schwitters’s	Merzbau	
as	the	spiritual	property	of 	its	artist,	but,	essentially,	myself 	as	its	heir:	its	transmissibility	as	a	collection	
finds	its	expression	in	my	current	appropriation	of 	it.	Schwitters’s	Merz	art,	its	philosophy,	practice,	and	
person,	are	the	contents	of 	my	collection,	such	that	I	would	ask	you	to	look	at	the	first	half 	of 	this	essay	as	
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an	objectivation	of 	that	collection.	To	return	to	the	example	of 	restoration,	my	project	here	is	an	attempt	at	
the	artistic	restoration	of 	the	Merzbau,	and	is,	consequently,	a	labor	of 	love	that	protests	against	death.
	 But	let	us	complicate	our	picture	of 	death	somewhat	by	looking	at	how	Marcuse	proposes	death’s	
own	function	of 	protest	through	love:
The	idea	of 	love,	however,	requires	that	the	individual	overcome	monadic	isolation	and	find	fulfill-
ment	through	the	surrender	of 	individuality	in	the	unconditional	solidarity	of 	two	persons.	In	a	
society	in	which	the	conflict	of 	interest	is	the	principium individuationis,	this	complete	surrender	can	ap-
pear	in	pure	form	only	in	death.	For	only	death	eliminates	all	of 	the	external	conditions	that	destroy	
permanent	solidarity	and	in	the	struggle	with	which	individuals	wear	themselves	out.	It	appears	not	
as	the	cessation	of 	existence	in	nothingness,	but	rather	as	the	only	possible	consummation	of 	love	
and	thus	as	its	deepest	significance.	(Marcuse	The Essential Marcuse	220)
Love	and	death	here	form	a	dyad	of 	protest	against	the	oppression	of 	capitalism’s	principium individuationis,	
for	they	serve	as	the	only	means	of 	escaping	the	inherent	inequality	and	separation	of 	individuals	propagat-
ed	by	that	system.	Death	and	love	are	thus	seen	as	liberating	forces,	insofar	as	they	break	down	the	bound-
aries	between	individuals.	As	he	writes,	“Death	does	not	come	from	outside,	but	from	love	itself ”	(219):	
death	is	not,	that	is,	inflicted	on	us	by	the	world,	but	by	our	desire	for	the	fulfillment	of 	love.	As	such,	I	am	
not	attempting	to	return	the	Merzbau	to	life,	for	that	is	beyond	the	power	of 	anyone,	and	is	necessarily	a	
failed,	useless	gesture;	rather,	I	am	seeking	to	find,	in	the	experience	of 	the	work	as dead,	a	way	in	which	that	
death	can	be	a	significant	force	for	the	protest	against	the	ideological	exigencies	of 	Fascism,	of 	a	totalizing	
universe,	through	the	rescue	of 	the	past	in	memory.
Pain, Sorrow, Guilt
	 We	should	not	be	misled	in	thinking	that	this	memory	is	anything	but	painful:	the	relation	one	has	
to	the	dead	is	necessarily	infected	by	feelings	of 	sorrow	and	guilt,	the	guilt	that	what	has	been	lost	is	in	some	
way	a	reflection	of 	our	own	impotence	and	failure.	As	Marcuse	so	eloquently	writes	on	the	relation	of 	art	
to	society:
Dialectical	logic	may	provide	meaning	and	justification	for	these	claims.	They	have	their	materialis-
tic	truth	in	Marx’s	analysis	of 	the	divergence	of 	essence	and	appearance	in	capitalist	society.	But	in	
the	confrontation	between	art	and	reality	they	become	mockery.	Auschwitz	and	My	Lai,	the	torture,	
starvation,	and	dying–is	this	entire	world	supposed	to	be	“mere	illusion”	and	“bitterer	deception”?	
It	remains	rather	the	“bitterer”	and	all	but	unimaginable	reality.	Art	draws	away	from	this	reality,	
because	it	cannot	represent	this	suffering	without	subjecting	it	to	aesthetic	form,	and	thereby	to	the	
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mitigating	catharsis,	to	enjoyment.	Art	is	inexorably	infested	with	this	guilt.	Yet	this	does	not	re-
lease	art	from	the	necessity	of 	recalling	again	and	again	that	which	can	survive	even	Auschwitz	and	
perhaps	one	day	make	it	impossible.	If 	even	this	memory	were	to	be	silenced,	then	the	“end	of 	art”	
would	indeed	have	come.	Authentic	art	preserves	this	memory	in	spite	of 	and	against	Auschwitz;	this	
memory	is	the	ground	in	which	art	has	always	originated–this	memory	and	the	need	to	create	im-
ages	of 	the	possible	“other.”	(Marcuse	The Aesthetic Dimension	56)
Art	inexorably	succumbs	to	the	necessity	of 	positing	itself 	as	the	other	to	an	oppressive	reality,	for	without	
such	a	movement	it	becomes	itself 	a	force	of 	that	oppression;	but	it	must	come	from	a	guilty	conscious,	a	
memory	of 	pain	that	must	at	all	costs	be	reconciled–	but	how?	How	can	art,	and	its	experience,	result	in	
the	reconciliation	of 	the	individual	to	his	past	and	to	his	failure?	How	is	it	at	all	possible	for	art	to	call	into	
question,	and	qualitatively	transform	its	experience,	a	past	experienced	as	one	of 	pain	and	anguish,	suffer-
ing	and	inhumanity?
	 Memory	as	a	regulative	idea,	memory	as	an	aesthetic	experience	of 	the	dead,	acts	positively	in	the	
salvaging	of 	the	past.	To	be	sure,	it	is	often	expressed	that	humanity	must	work	for	a	better	future;	but	this	
desire	conceals	the	tremendous	labor	still	to	be	done:	a	liberated	humanity	cannot	abolish	its	past,	cannot	
propel	itself 	into	liberation,	without	first	redeeming	its	past:
In	every	era	the	attempt	must	be	made	anew	to	wrest	tradition	away	from	a	conformism	that	is	
about	to	overpower	it.	The	Messiah	comes	not	only	as	the	redeemer,	he	comes	as	the	subduer	of 	An-
tichrist.	Only	that	historian	will	have	the	gift	of 	fanning	the	spark	of 	hope	in	the	past	who	is	firmly	
convinced	that	even the dead	will	not	be	safe	from	the	enemy	if 	he	wins.	And	this	enemy	has	not	ceased	
to	be	victorious.	(Benjamin	“Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of 	History”	255)
The	tradition	of 	which	Benjamin	speaks	is	the	universal,	totalized	tradition	that	enforces	the	perspective	
that	the	past	acts	as	justification	for	the	ruling	powers	of 	the	present.	These	victors	of 	history	are	necessar-
ily	complicit	in	the	oppression	of 	the	revolutionary	class,	and	any	alignment	with	those	victors	on	the	part	
of 	the	historian,	or	artist,	is	an	affirmation	of 	that	oppression.	We	cannot	look	forever	forward,	as	that	is	
tantamount	to	forgetting	the	pain	and	sorrow	which	is	our	inheritance,	for	this	forgetting	is	moreover	the	
principle	through	which	the	inequality	of 	society	perpetuates	itself.	
	 The	project	of 	history,	and,	by	extension,	the	aestheticization	of 	memory,	must	thus	be	seen	as	a	
method	for	the	redemption	of 	the	past.	But	the	present	always	carries	us	forward,	like	Benjamin’s	angel	of 	
history	who	can	only	watch	the	catastrophe	while	being	swept	forever	into	the	future:
This	is	how	one	pictures	the	angel	of 	history.	His	face	is	turned	toward	the	past.	Where	we	perceive	
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a	chain	of 	events,	he	sees	one	single	catastrophe	which	keeps	piling	wreckage	upon	wreckage	and	
hurls	it	in	front	of 	his	feet.	The	angel	would	like	to	stay,	awaken	the	dead,	and	make	whole	what	has	
been	smashed.	But	a	storm	is	blowing	from	Paradise;	it	has	got	caught	in	his	wings	with	such	vio-
lence	that	the	angel	can	no	longer	close	them.	This	storm	irresistibly	propels	him	into	the	future	to	
which	his	back	is	turned,	while	the	pile	of 	debris	before	him	grows	skyward.	This	storm	is	what	we	
call	progress.	(259)
To	redeem	the	past,	then,	we	must	somehow	be	able	to	carry	it	with	us,	and	this	process	is	remembrance.	
Remembrance	of 	the	dead	is	their	last	remaining	recourse	to	continued	presence.	Art	is	at	once	an	objec-
tivation	of 	this	memory,	and,	in	the	case	of 	the	Merzbau,	its	frustration.	For	we	are	ourselves	caught	in	this	
storm,	and	cannot	undo	what	has	been	done,	nor	can	we	experience	that	objectivation	physically	but,	in	all	
truth,	only	as	a	spiritual	presence	that	must	be	invoked	by	proxy:	we	must	set	up	the	historical	record	of 	the	
work	as	an	alternate	to	the	work	itself–as	Benjamin’s	portrait	photography	stands	in	for	the	deceased–and	
probe	its	countenance	for	the	breaking	forth	of 	spirit.	In	this	way	is	the	Merzbau	dead,	and	in	this	way	must	
we	approach	it	if 	we	are	to	approach	it	at	all:	as	a		remembrance	of 	the	dead.
	 I	am	convinced,	however,	that	this	experience	is	a	liberating	one,	for	it	preserves	the	promise	of 	
liberation	and	happiness.	“Only	in	memory	and	longing”,	writes	Adorno,	“not	as	a	copy	or	as	an	immedi-
ate	effect,	is	pleasure	absorbed	by	art”	(Adorno	14):	memory–in	spite	of 	its	pain,	if 	not	because	of 	it–is	thus	
bonded	to	pleasure,	as	much	as	to	happiness	and	the	perpetuation	of 	joy.	As	Marcuse	is	only	too	clear:
Forgetting	past	suffering	and	past	joy	alleviates	life	under	a	repressive	reality	principle.	In	contrast,	
remembrance	spurs	the	drive	for	the	conquest	of 	suffering	and	the	permanence	of 	joy.	But	the	force	
of 	remembrance	is	frustrated:	joy	itself 	is	overshadowed	by	pain.	Inexorably	so?	The	horizon	of 	
history	is	still	open.	If 	the	remembrance	of 	things	past	would	become	a	motive	power	in	the	struggle	
for	changing	the	world,	the	struggle	would	be	waged	for	a	revolution	hitherto	suppressed	in	the	pre-
vious	historical	revolutions.	(Marcuse	The Aesthetic Dimension	73)
I	see	in	this	the	culmination	of 	everything	that	has	been	said	up	till	now:	the	method	through	which	art	can	
enter	the	struggle	for	liberation	and	equality,	happiness	and	love,	is	through	remembrance,	for	only	remem-
brance	confronts	us	with	our	pain.	Forgetfulness,	on	the	other	hand,	is	always	forgetfulness	of 	oppression	
and	the	fact	that	our	current	happiness	and	equality	is	an	illusion,	while	remembrance	calls	us	to	action;	
and	art	is	the	means	through	which	memory	can	be	secured.
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Overcoming
	 If 	I	have	learned	anything,	if 	I	have	communicated	anything,	it	will	justify	my	final	claim,	wherein	
I	hope	to	make	good	on	my	promise:	Art	that	is	dead,	art	that	is	memory–in	a	name,	Kurt	Schwitters’s	
Merzbau–is	an	accusation	against	a	world	that	has	refused	to	become	equal,	that	has	rejected	the	project	of 	
man’s	liberation	and	enforced	his	spiritual,	material	oppression.	The	aesthetic	experience	of 	remembrance	
calls	to	us,	like	the	wreckage	of 	history	before	the	angel’s	feet,	to	salvage	the	principle	of 	redemption	within	
and	out	of 	that	wreckage,	while	yet	being	propelled	forever	into	the	future.	Memory	is	the	refuge	wherein	
we	are	able	to	transform	the	destruction	and	oppression	carried	out	by	the	world’s	victors	into	a	spirit	of 	
equality	and	liberation.	But	this	memory	is	also	always	and	necessarily	an	accusation	against	our	cowardice	
and	contentment	with	an	accustomed	but	illusory	happiness.	This	is	the	pain,	sorrow,	and	guilt	of 	art	that	
finds	its	expression	in	the	experience	of 	its	own	death.	
	 We	are	the	heirs	of 	Schwitters’s	Merz	theater,	but	it	can	only	haunt	us	with	the	ghosts	of 	its	play-
ers:	Kurt	is	nailing	a	broken	train	to	the	wall,	Ernst	is	holding	the	glue,	the	mice	scurry,	Helma	watches	in	
silence–their	forms	float	before	one’s	mind	within	an	imagined	world	that	cannot	be	imagined,	for	its	death	
is	irrevocable.	The	grottoes	silently	stare	from	within	their	plaster	tomb;	his	son’s	death	mask	is	mute	but	
immune;	the	columns	and	walls	stand	tall,	bend,	and	at	last	break.	A	ruin	that	has	not	even	the	pieces	of 	its	
building,	for	the	ground	has	been	cleared	and	prepared	for	a	new	building	that	cannot	hope	to	due	justice	
to	its	heritage.	We	realize,	however,	that	its	memory	is	all,	at	last,	we	have,	and	it	is	with	this	material	that	
we	must	come	to	terms	or	be	overwhelmed	by	our	own	impotence:	to,	in	short,	make	whole	what	has	been	
smashed,	or	let	the	pieces	float	away	into	the	sea	of 	lost	time.	The	accusation	demands	that	the	longing	
and	frustrated	happiness	of 	which	art	itself 	is	can	become	a	force	for	changing,	perhaps	only	first	ourselves,	
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perhaps	only	then	our	relation	to	our	friends	and	country,	but	someday	near	or	far	for	the	changing	of 	the	
world.	But	it	is	always	as	a	half 	moon,	who	gleams	at	us	in	the	darkness	of 	the	night,	provoking	us	with	the	
uncertainty	of 	whether	it	is	growing	into	wholeness,	or	vanishing	into	nothing.
	 If 	memory	is	capable	of 	transforming	the	world,	it	must	come	first	as	an	aesthetic	presence	within	
the	individual	subject–in	this	case,	it	must	come	into	myself.	From	its	inception	as	an	aesthetic	experience,	
its	force	rests	secondly	in	its	capacity	to	be	transmitted,	to,	in	effect,	be	reproduced	in	the	minds	of 	others.	
But	one	cannot	accomplish	this	with	history	alone	or	theory	alone,	nor	one’s	self 	alone,	but	they	must	all	
cooperate	and	draw	on	the	strengths	of 	each	other:	history	provides	the	material,	theory	the	approach,	and	
the	self 	provides	the	subject	who	must	experience	and	give	shape.	That	is	why	I	have	written	this	the	way	
I	have,	for	I	am	myself 	the	principle	of 	the	work’s	liberation	from	death	into	spirit–into	memory–into	the	
present	out	of 	the	wreckage	of 	the	past.	The	spirit	becomes	politic,	the	politic	becomes	spirit,	the	weight	
of 	sorrow	returns	in	the	work	of 	art	to	thrust	us	into	the	present.	And	here	we	stand	abandoned	but	proud,	
fractured	and	pitiable,	but	alive.	Here	we	confront	Hitler	and	Fascism,	here	we	confront	the	perpetua-
tion	of 	man’s	inhumanity	to	man,	here	we	confront	the	failures	and	the	refuse,	here	we	confront	ourselves	
against	ourselves,	here	we	confront	society,	art,	redemption,	oppression.	For	if 	we	do	not	confront	them	
here,	we	will	never	confront	them.	We	will	never	inherent	the	fullness	of 	our	past	but	only	be	accused	by	it	
as	cowards,	corrupted	and	homogenized	within	the	bankruptcy	of 	universals	to	guarantee	happiness	to	the	
fragmented.	
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